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HIS article is intended to provide an updated summary of the rele-
vant Texas law regarding the recovery of legal fees and expenses in
business litigation and to highlight the most significant develop-
ments in this area of law during the Survey period.1 Since our last survey,
the Texas Supreme Court has opined generally on the level of specificity
required by a Texas court that determines that "costs" pursuant to Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 131 are "otherwise than as provided by law," but
no notable pronouncements involving the recovery of attorneys' fees in
Texas have been handed down from our highest state court.2 However,
the enactment of Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Sec-
tion 26.003, which requires that fees in class action lawsuits be awarded
using the lodestar method and limits the trial court's ability to enhance
the lodestar award, is an important legislative enactment discussed in this
year's review. Additionally, the scope of this article has been expanded
to include several fee recovery statutes not addressed in our last survey.
Section one discusses the most common ways to recover legal fees in
business litigation cases. Section two analyzes Texas Disciplinary Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.04 and case law interpreting the same. Section
three addresses recurring issues in the recovery of fees that any litigant
practicing business litigation in Texas should understand-pre-petition
recovery, segregation of fees, and the recovery of legal assistant and ap-
pellate fees. Finally, section four discusses the recovery of litigation costs
and expenses.
* Ralph I. Miller is the managing partner of the litigation section of the Dallas office
of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. Mr. Miller practices complex commercial litigation and
has testified on the subject of attorneys' fees on several occasions. Mr. Miller graduated
from the University of Texas with highest honors in 1972.
** Angela C. Zambrano is an attorney at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas,
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odist University in 1997.
*** Michelle Hartmann is an attorney at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas,
Texas. She graduated summa cum laude from Southern Methodist University in 2001. The
authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Elizabeth Clements, Kate Jett, Mea-
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1. The Survey period runs from October 1, 2002 to September 1, 2003. This article is
not intended to analyze all Texas statutes that provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
2. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 123-24 (Tex. 2003).
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I. BUSINESS LITIGATION STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
The general rule in Texas is that litigants are not entitled to recover
attorneys' fees and expenses from their opponent unless a contractual3 or
statutory provision provides otherwise.4 As with every general maxim,
however, the exceptions appear to often swallow the rule. This first sec-
tion introduces the statutes most commonly used by litigants to recover
legal fees and costs and discusses recent developments (during the Survey
Period) affecting these statutes.
In Texas, litigants involved in business litigation most commonly use
three statutory vehicles to recover attorneys' fees: (1) Chapter 38 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the "Code") (authorizing fees in
breach of contract actions), (2) Chapter 37 of the Code (authorizing fees
in declaratory judgment actions), and (3) Chapter 17 of the Code (au-
thorizing fees in actions brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act). 5 Statutes sanctioning the recovery of attorneys' fees in
securities, insurance, intellectual property, antitrust law, and covenant
not to compete cases also exist under Texas law. 6 Finally, although the
law in this area is unsettled, attorneys' fees can sometimes be recovered
on equitable grounds.
A. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTIONS.
Chapter 38 of the Code permits a prevailing party to recover attorneys'
fees and costs in a breach of contract case. 7 To obtain attorneys' fees
3. A contractual provision providing for attorneys' fees "will establish a prima facie
case that the stipulated amount is reasonable and recoverable .... The burden then shifts
to the opposing party to plead, prove, and request an issue on an affirmative defense that
(1) the contractual amount is unreasonable, and (2) a particular known amount would be
reasonable." O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co., 80 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
no pet.) (citing F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 578
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1979). The parties can adopt a liberal or more rigorous standard for
recovering attorneys' fees within their contract. Wayne v. A.V.A. Vending, Inc., 52 S.W.3d
412, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
4. See Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999); Travelers Indem.
Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v.
Seven Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. 1992); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus.,
Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967); Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. 1964);
Mundy v. Knutson Constr. Co., 294 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. 1956); Massey v. Columbus State
Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Simmons v.
Harris County, 917 S.W.2d 376, 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied);
State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
5. Other claims that a business litigator should consider seeking legal fees in connec-
tion with include federal and certain state antitrust, trade regulation, racketeering, intellec-
tual property and covenant not to compete claims. See infra notes 77-158. Similarly,
although not specifically addressed in this article, attorneys' fees may be awarded as
"costs" pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.259(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
6. See discussion, infra notes 77-158.
7. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2001). Section 38.000 pro-
vides that "a person may recover reasonable attorneys' fees from an individual or corpora-
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under Chapter 38, a party must satisfy three requirements: (1) prevail8
and recover damages 9 in its breach of contract action;10 (2) present evi-
dence of a reasonable fee for the services rendered in connection with the
prevailing claim; and (3) satisfy the procedural requirements of Sec-
tion 38.002 regarding "presentment."'" Provided that a litigant satisfies
these requirements, recovery of attorneys' fees under this provision is
tion, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for: 1) rendered
services; 2) performed labor; 3) furnished material; 4) freight or express overcharges; 5)
lost or damaged freight or express; 6) killed or injured stock; 7) a sworn account; or 8) an
oral or written contract." TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2001).
Chapter 38 does not apply to some contracts issued by insurers. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 38.006 (Vernon 2001). Also, one cannot recover fees for a breach of
warranty claim pursuant to Section 38.001(8). See JHC Ventures, L. P. v. Fast Trucking,
Inc., 94 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
8. Traditionally, courts have defined prevailing party as "'one of the parties to a suit
who successfully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the
main issue, even though not to the extent of its original contention."' Johns v. Ram-For-
warding, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (quoting
City of Amarillo v. Glick, 991 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (citing
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Graham, 882 S.W.2d 890, 900 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, no writ))). However, in a recent case, the Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that
this definition was adopted from the Black's Law Dictionary published in 1979 and that the
more recent edition, published in 1999, defined prevailing as "a party in whose favor a
judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded." Flagship Hotel,
Ltd. v. City of Galveston, 117 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. filed)
(internal citation omitted). The Flagship Hotel court examined the case law interpreting
the "prevailing party" requirement and adopted the definition in the 1999 edition of
Black's Law Dictionary. Id. at 565. The court further held that "[i]f multiple parties re-
ceive judgment under the cause of action, the party which received judgment on the main
issue is the prevailing party." Id. Other courts have simply defined the prevailing party as
one who is "vindicated by the trial court's judgment." Polk v. St. Angelo, No. 03-01-00356-
C, 2002 WL 1070550, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Austin May 31, 2002, pet. denied); Dear v. City
of Irving, 902 S.W.2d 731, 739 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
9. See Mobil Producing Tex. & New Mexico, Inc. v. Cantor, 93 S.W.3d 916 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.), Brosseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). Even if a party "prevails," several courts have held that the
statute requires that the party also recover damages to obtain legal fees pursuant to Sec-
tion 38.001. See Green Int'l, Inc. v, Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Tex. 1997); see also Kinsey
v. Repinecz, No. 01-02-00022-CV, 2003 WL 21357299, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist] June 12, 2003, no pet.); Law Offices of Windle Turley P.C. v. French, No. 2-01-080-
CV, 2003 WL 253643, at *7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Feb. 6, 2003, no pet.) (denying attor-
neys' fees when no damages or anything of value awarded); N.T. Dev., Inc. v. Petersen, 79
S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) but see Ram-Forwarding Inc., 29
S.W.3d at 638; Cysco Enters., Inc. v. Hardeman Family Joint Venture, Ltd., No. 03-02-
00230-CV-2002 WL 31833724, at *6 (Tex. App. -Austin Dec. 19, 2002, no pet.) ("Deter-
mining whether a party is the prevailing or successful party must be based upon success on
the merits, and not whether damages were awarded.").
10. A defendant cannot recover fees under Section 38.001 for defeating a breach of
contract claim. See Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Johnson, No. 03-00-00559-CV, 2002 WL
1991141, at *12 (Tex. App.-Austin, Aug. 30, 2002, pet. denied). However, the "party
seeking attorneys' fees need not obtain net recovery." Gereb v. Smith-Jaye, 70 S.W.3d 272
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
11. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REMEDIES CODE ANN. §§ 38.001, 38.002 (Vernon 2001);
Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, writ denied). Section 38.002 provides (1) the claimant must be represented by
an attorney; (2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a duly
authorized agent of the opposing party; and (3) the payment for the just amount owed




mandatory.12 A trial court has discretion to fix the amount of attorneys'
fees, but the general rule is that the court does not have the discretion to
completely deny attorneys' fees if a litigant has satisfied the requirements
of Section 38.001.'
1 3
Importantly, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Section 38.001 to
provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees for fraud claims when the
fraud arises out of a breach of contract action.14 Other appellate courts
have extended this exception to any "tort" that arises out of a breach of
contract.1 5
1. Presenting Evidence of a Reasonable Fee
Chapter 38 requires the litigant to "present evidence" regarding the
reasonable nature of the fee award sought.16 However, under Sec-
tion 38.003 of the Code, "[i]t is presumed that the usual and customary
attorneys' fees for a claim of the type described in Section 38.001 are
reasonable.' a7 While this does not mean that the court must award the
12. See Cale's Clean Scene Carwash, Inc. v. Hubbard, 76 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Cotter v. Todd, No. 04-01-00084-CV, 2002 WL
31253397, at *6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Oct. 9, 2002, no pet.); Jackson Law Office, P.C.
v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 23 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied); World Help v. Leisure
Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 683 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); Budd v.
Gay, 846 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
13. Lee v. Perez, 120 S.W.3d 463, 469-70 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no
pet.); World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 683. In Lee, the Houston (Fourteenth District) Court of
Appeals discussed this general rule set forth in Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801
S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990), but noted that "[a] recent case by a panel of visiting judges in
this court suggests the contrary." Lee, 120 S.W.3d at 470 n.27 (citing Anderson, Green-
wood & Co. v. Martin, 44 S.W.3d 200, 221 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet.
denied)). However, it thereafter held *that "[a]s the panel did not distinguish (or even
mention) Ragsdale, and was addressing a question rendered moot by its dismissal of the
contract claim, we instead follow the holding of the higher court." Id.
14. See Gill Sav. Ass'n. v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1990).
15. Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 829 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992, writ granted), affd as modified, Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 841
S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992) (citing Gill Say. Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 31); Wilson v. Ferguson, 747
S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ denied)). This was true in one case when the
party seeking fees did not actually prevail on the breach of contract claim. See Adams v.
H&H Meat Prods., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 780 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.). In
DP Solutions, Inc. v. Rollins, Inc., 353 F.3d 421, 430-31 (5th Cir. 2003), in the absence of
clear direction from the Texas Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was
required to make an Erie guess regarding whether attorneys' fees were recoverable under
an equitable exception for tortious interference with an existing contract. Id. ("When the
highest state court is silent on an issue we must make an Erie guess."). The Fifth Circuit
relied heavily on a Beaumont Court of Appeals opinion in holding that attorneys' fees
were recoverable: "We hold that Texas Beef Cattle is the appropriate Texas precedent to
apply in this diversity case ... [and that the] exception is limited to situations 'where the
natural and proximate results and consequences of prior wrongful acts had been to involve
a plaintiff . . . in litigation with and against third parties and other parties."' Id. (quoting
Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 883 S.W.2d 415, 430 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994), rev'd on
other grounds, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996).
16. Notably, Section 38.001 does not require evidence that the attorneys' fees were
necessary or that the client agreed to pay for them. See Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800
S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); Prairie Valley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Saw-
yer, 665 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon 2001).
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full amount of "usual and customary fees,' 8 at least one court has held
that the "usual and customary" fees determined by the court create a
ceiling above which the court cannot award fees. 19 Notwithstanding this
ceiling, the court relied on Section 38.001 to uphold a trial court award of
an amount below that ceiling. 20 Moreover, the presumption in favor of
the reasonableness of "usual and customary" fees can be rebutted by
competent evidence. 21
Texas courts can also take judicial notice of the usual and customary
attorneys' fees and the contents of the case file without receiving any
other evidence in a bench trial or in a jury case in which the amount of
attorneys' fees is submitted to the court with the consent of the parties.22
This means that in such circumstances, the court can determine the rea-
sonable amount of attorneys' fees independent of the work described in
the case file and the "usual and customary" fees for a similar claim.23
2. Presentment
Presentment is an often overlooked element necessary to recover attor-
neys' fees in a breach of contract action. 24 Section 38.002 requires a liti-
gant seeking attorneys' fees to "present the claim to the opposing party
or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party."'25 This means that a
plaintiff seeking fees under this chapter must both plead2 6 and prove pre-
sentment to recover attorneys' fees claimed.27 Presentment can be made
either before or after suit is filed, but presentment must be at least thirty
days before judgment.28 Various forms of presentment have been held to
18. Bethel v. Butler Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th




22. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 2001). Of course, absent
the agreement of the parties, the party seeking attorneys' fees must present evidence in
support of its request. Tristan v. C.A. Walker, Inc., No. 13-01-410-CV, 2003 WL 21212342,
at *5 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May 27, 2003, pet. denied).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Air Park Dallas Zoning Comm. v. Crow Billingsley Airpark, Ltd., 109
S.W.3d 900, 913 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
25. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 2001).
26. See Llanes v. Davila, No. 13-02-129-CV, 2003 WL 124833, at *5 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Jan. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (holding that "neither the filing of a suit, nor the
allegation of a demand in the pleadings can alone constitute presentment of a claim or a
demand that the claim be paid" and refusing to consider demand at mediation because lack
of record of such alleged presentment).
27. VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 867 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
28. Id. The pleadings themselves do not constitute a demand. Id.; see also Grace v.
Duke, 54 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied) ("[Tihe mere filing of a
breach of contract suit does not constitute presentment."). The rationale behind the pre-
sentment requirement is to permit a defendant to pay a claim before accruing attorneys'
fees. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 867.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
be sufficient.29 It may be informal and even oral,30 but essentially, some
form of notice must be given before judgment 31 unless the parties agree
to contractually waive this requirement. 32 Importantly, however, an un-
reasonably excessive demand is improper and will result in the disallow-
ance of fees.33
B. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS
Chapter 37 of the Code permits the recovery of costs and attorneys'
fees in declaratory judgment actions.34 Specifically, Section 37.009 autho-
29, Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (holding letter and telephone con-
versation informing sellers of buyers' intentions to go through with sale of property met
requirements of presentment); Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 355, 358
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (holding that oral request to tender
full performance under contract, which was refused, sufficient to establish presentment);
Marifarms Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Westhoff, 802 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991,
no writ) (oral demand during deposition); De Los Santos v. S.W. Tex. Methodist Hosp.,
802 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ) (original bill or invoice sent
to buyer); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 719 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (same); Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners Ass'n, 758
S.W.2d 921, 926-27 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (holding demand letter
and testimony that demand was made and turned down was sufficient to establish present-
ment);.Chandler v. Mastercraft Dental Corp., 739 S.W.2d 460, 470 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1987, writ denied) (discussion between attorneys regarding claim); Plains Ins. Co. v. Evans,
692 S.W.2d 952, 956-57 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ) (same); Tierney v. Lane,
Gorman, Trubitt & Co., 664 S.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)
(notation on check paid under protest); Humble Exploration Co. v. Amcap Petroleum
Assocs., 658 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discovery re-
quest); Welch v. Gammage, 545 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that request for admission and its response in which party admitted refusal
to pay a claim sufficient to establish presentment); Hudson v. Smith, 391 S.W.2d 441, 451
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (prior lawsuit).
30. See W. Beach Marina, Ltd. v. Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 269 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, no pet.).
31. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 867; see also Bethel v. Norman Furniture Co., 756 S.W.2d
6, 8 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) ("When the question of attorney's fees
is submitted to the court, the court may consider the entire case file to determine whether
presentment was made."); Llanes, 2003 WL 124833, at *7 (pleading presentment and alle-
gations are not challenged establishes presentment); Sanchez v. Jary, 768 S.W.2d 933, 936
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ); Wallace v. Ramon, 82 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
32. Escalante v. Luckie, 77 S.W.3d 410 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
33. Id. Of course, the demand does not have to be for the exact amount the litigant is
entitled to recover. See W. Beach Marina, Ltd., 94 S.W.3d at 269. A demand is not neces-
sarily excessive simply because a jury later determines that the litigant is entitled to less
money. Cameron v. Bell, No. 13-01-767-CV, 2003 WL 253609, at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Feb. 6, 2003, no pet.). Further, a party must affirmatively assert the defense of
excessive demand in their pleadings and request findings of fact on the essential element of
excessive demand. Id.
34. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 2001). Of course, the party
seeking fees must plead the request for attorneys' fees in connection with the request for
declaratory relief. See Shepard v. Boone, 99 S.W.3d 263, 266-67 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2003, no pet.). In Shepard, the Eastland Court of Appeals found plaintiffs' request, in the
prayer of their third amended original petition, for "[r]easonable attorney's fees" and a
"declaration that the Substitute Trustee's Deed, the Note, the Deed of Trust, the Con-




rizes the trial court, in its discretion, to award "reasonable and necessary"
attorneys' fees that are "equitable and just."'35 Further, pursuant to Sec-
tion 37.009, even non-prevailing parties are permitted to recover attor-
neys' fees. 36
The trial court has broad discretion to award or deny attorneys' fees
under Section 37.009. 37 Indeed, absent specific findings of fact, appellate
courts in Texas are reluctant to find that a trial court abused its discretion
in awarding or declining to award attorneys' fees pursuant to this
section. 38
Nevertheless, the Code does impose certain limitations on the trial
court's discretion.39 First, the fees awarded must be "reasonable and nec-
essary."'40 Whether the fees are "reasonable and necessary" are fact
questions, 41 and a factually insufficient record will not support an award
35. See Ranger Ins. Co. v. Ward, 107 S.W.3d 820, 830 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003,
pet. denied) ("Since overall, the trial court did not err in its interpretation and application
of the law, it did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Landowners.");
Parts Indus. Corp. v. A.V.A. Servs., Inc., 104 S.W.3d 671, 685 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2003, no pet.) ("[I]t is the court's discretion whether to award attorney's fees in declaratory
judgment actions and [appellant] has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by
denying it attorney's fees."); Dimock v. Kadane, 100 S.W.3d 602, 608 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2003, pet. denied) ("The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's
fees."); see also Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) ("The statute thus af-
fords the trial court a measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees or
not."); Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985) ("[T]he grant or denial of
attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action lies within the discretion of the trial court,
and its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing that it abused its
discretion."); Justice Bail Bonds v. Samaniego, 68 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2001, pet. denied); Hansen v. Academy Corp., 961 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied); Trien v. Equity Real Estate, Inc., No. 08-99-00464-CV, 2001
WL 1383115, at *4 (Tex. App.-El Paso Nov. 8, 2001, no pet.).
36. See, e.g., Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803, 816-17 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) ("[T]he trial court is not required to award attorney's fees to
the prevailing party in a declaratory judgment action... Additionally, a trial court may, in
its discretion, award attorney's fees to the non-prevailing party in a declaratory judgment
action."); Black v. City of Killeen, 78 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied)
("Whether a party prevails is not a determining factor in avoiding attorney's fees."); Bar-
shop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 637 (Tex.
1996) ("[T]he award of attorney's fees in declaratory judgment actions is clearly within the
trial court's discretion and is not dependent on a finding that a party 'substantially
prevailed."').
37. Ranger Ins. Co., 107 S.W.3d at 830; Parts Indus. Corp., 104 S.W.3d at 685; Bocquet,
972 S.W.2d at 20.
38. Marion v. Davis, 106 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied)
("[Plaintiff] did not request any findings of fact on the attorney's fees issue, and none were
filed. Without findings of fact establishing the basis for the trial court's exercise of discre-
tion, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the court abused its discretion in declining
to award attorney's fees.").
39. TEX. CiV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009.
40. Id.
41. Id.; Marion, 106 S.W.3d at 868 ("Whether the attorney's fees are reasonable and
necessary are fact questions."); Brush v. Reata Oil & Gas Corp., 984 S.W.2d 720, 729 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied). The fact finder can seek guidance on whether fees are
"reasonable and necessary" by examining the factors provided by Texas Disciplinary Rule
1.04, discussed in detail below. See Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21; infra Section II; but see
Schwedler v. Wright, No. 07-98-0281-CV, 1999 WL 236511, at *7 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2004]
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of attorneys' fees. 42 However, as recently stated by the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals, the standard for factual sufficiency is easily met: "[a]n asser-
tion that the evidence is 'insufficient' to support a fact finding means that
the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence to the
contrary is so overwhelming that the answer should be set aside and a
new trial ordered. '43
Second, the recovery of fees must be "equitable and just."' 4 4 The ques-
tion of whether an award of fees is "equitable and just" is an issue to be
resolved by the court.4 5
Finally, while either party can recover attorneys' fees pursuant to Sec-
tion 37.009,46 fees cannot be awarded when the declaratory judgment
claim is the mere "mirror image" of another asserted claim.47 The Austin
Court of Appeals, in Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Systems, Inc., recently ex-
plained that "[i]t is an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees under
[the Declaratory Judgment Act] when the relief sought is no greater than
relief that otherwise exists by agreement or statute. '48 There, a taxpayer
who paid sales tax on the purchase of certain overhead items sued the
state Comptroller for a refund and simultaneously sought declaratory re-
lief and attorneys' fees regarding this alleged unlawful denial of the tax-
Apr. 8, 1999, pet. denied) (no publication) (opining that the Arthur Andersen court's use of
"should" rather than "must" makes the 1.04 analysis discretionary).
42. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21; see also Sealy v. Guerrero, No. 08-02-00367-CV, 2003
WL 22516225, at *3 (Tex. App.-El Paso Nov. 6, 2003, no pet.) (reversing award for lack of
evidence of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees in record). Note that, unlike in a
breach of contract case, a court may not take judicial notice of attorneys' fees in a declara-
tory judgment case. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 311-12
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet. h.).
43. Karen Corp. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 107 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
44. TEX. CIv. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 2002).
45. Marion, 106 S.W.3d at 868; see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22
S.W.3d 351, 367 (Tex. 2000); Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 ("Matters of equity are addressed
to the trial court's discretion ... so is the responsibility for just decisions."); Trien v. Equity
Real Estate, Inc., No. 08-99-00464-Cv, 2001 WL 1383115, at *4 (Tex. App.-El Paso Nov.
8, 2001, no pet.).
46. Note, only a party asserting a breach of contract can receive fees pursuant to Sec-
tion 38.001. See Smith v. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co., 82 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied).
47. See Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d 739, 746-77 (Tex. App.-Austin
1995, writ denied); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 638-39 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); John Chezik Buick Co. v. Friendly Chevrolet Co., 749
S.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied). The question often becomes
whether the issue is already pending before the court when the request for a declaration is
sought-if it is not, fees can be awarded so long as the declaration sought does not closely
resemble the plaintiff's claims. See Hawk v. E.K. Arledge, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 2003, pet. denied); John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Dew-
hurst, 90 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tex. 2002) (denying fees where declaratory relief was merely
incidental to title issues); Brousseau v. Ranzou, 81 S.W.3d at 381 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2002, no pet.); Thomas v. Thomas, 902 S.W.2d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ
denied); Brush v. Reata Oil & Gas Corp., 984 S.W.2d 752, 730-31 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998,
pet. denied); but see Hanzel v. Herring, 80 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no
pet.).




payer's refund. 49 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for
declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. 50
On appeal, this dismissal was upheld pursuant to the well-settled rule
in Texas that "'[t]here is no basis for declaratory relief when a party is
seeking in the same action a different, enforceable remedy, and a judicial
declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or express in a
final judgment for the enforceable remedy." '51 Because plaintiff's re-
quest for statutory interpretation was "merely another mechanism for
asking the court to order the Comptroller to issue a sales tax refund," the
plaintiff could not recover fees through a declaratory judgment action. 52
C. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN A DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACTION
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the "DTPA") also permits
the recovery of attorneys' fees-indeed, the award of these fees to a pre-
vailing "consumer" is mandatory under the DTPA. 53 Similarly, the
DTPA mandates the recovery of "reasonable and necessary attorneys'
fees and costs" to a defendant for an action that is found to be "ground-
less in fact or law, or brought in bad faith, or brought for purposes of
harassment. ' 54 Unlike the recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant to Sec-
tion 38.001 (for breach of contract actions), however, plaintiffs and de-
fendants must demonstrate that the award of fees under the DTPA is not
only "reasonable," but also "necessary," as is the case when seeking fees
pursuant to Section 37.009 (for declaratory judgment actions). 55
49. Id. at 562.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 572 (quoting Universal Printing Co. v. Premier Victorian Homes, Inc., 73
S.W.3d 283, 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).
52. Id.; see also Hawk, 107 S.W.3d at 84 (stating that "[tihe reality in this lawsuit is that
it involves the issue of title" and thus "[tihe claim for declaratory relief is 'merely inciden-
tal to the title issues' and attorney's fees are not recoverable") (quoting Dewhurst, 90
S.W.3d at 289)); but see Aquaduct, L.L.C. v. McElhenie, 116 S.W.3d 438, 444-46 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet. h.) (overruling appellant's argument that appel-
lee's counterclaim is a trespass to try title suit in the guise of a request for declaratory
relief).
53. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002). "If a prevailing party
recovers damages, attorney's fees for a violation of the DTPA are mandatory." Cont'l
Dredging, Inc. v. DeKaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 380, 396 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet.
filed).
54. Gonzales v. Am. Title Co. of Houston, 104 S.W.3d 588, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (quoting TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon
2002)).
55. See Busteed v. Coldspring Oakhurst Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 07-02-0013-CV,
2002 WL 31549428, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Nov. 18, 2002, no pet.) ("[U]nlike the
provisions of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.50(d), which requires that attorney's fees must be
necessary in a proceeding under the [DTPA], Section 38.001 only requires that the amount
of attorney's fees be reasonable without reference to necessity thereof.") (citing Murrco
Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d at 606 (emphasis added)).
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1. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Consumer
Since Section 17.50(d) of the DTPA provides that a prevailing con-
sumer shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attor-
neys' fees, the critical determinations to any award of fees are whether
the consumer has "prevailed" 56 and whether the fees are "reasonable and
necessary."57
In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., the Texas Su-
preme Court held that attorneys' fees may be "reasonable" as between
the client and attorney for purposes of the standard set forth in Rule 104
of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, but unreasona-
ble in the context of an award for attorneys' fees under the DTPA. 58 Re-
cently, in Allison v. Fire Insurance Exchange, the Austin Court of
Appeals looked to these Arthur Andersen factors in finding evidence le-
gally sufficient to support an $8.9 million fee award under the DTPA.59
In Allison, insured homeowners brought, inter alia, DTPA claims against
their insurer relating to the insurer's handling of insurance claims for
water damage and mold remediation. 60 Following a jury trial, in which
the jury verdict exceeded $32 million dollars against Fire Insurance Ex-
change for its handling of the insured's claims, the insurer appealed. 6 1
As to the jury's award of $8.9 million in fees, the defendant insurer
argued the evidence was insufficient to support such a large award, in
part, because the plaintiffs' attorneys did not submit any hourly time
56. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 2002); see also Gulf States Utils.
Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) (denying attorneys' fees for failure to prevail on
DTPA claim); Deutsch v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek, LLP, 97 S.W.3d 179, 199 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th District] 2002, no pet.) (denying attorneys' fees where counter claimant
client of a law firm did not prevail on his DTPA claim). The Texas Supreme Court has
interpreted the term "prevailed" liberally. See McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.
1985). For example, the supreme court has held that a consumer "prevails" if the con-
sumer has been awarded any of the remedies authorized under Section 17.50(b), even if a
net recovery was awarded against the consumer. Id.; see also Cont'l Dredging, 120 S.W.3d
at 396 ("while only a prevailing party may recover under Section 17.50, net recovery in the
overall suit is not required.").
57. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
58. Id. For purposes of determining the reasonableness of a fee, the Texas Supreme
Court set forth several important factors to consider:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly; (2) the
likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude
other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the local-
ity for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results ob-
tained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client of by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7)
the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results ob-
tained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been
rendered.
Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 262-63 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet. h.) (cit-
ing Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818).
59. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 263.
60. Id. at 233.
61. Id. at 233.
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sheets.62 Overruling this point, the court of appeals stated,
[The plaintiffs' expert] testified, based on his experience in complex
cases and review of the [case] file, that [plaintiffs'] attorneys spent a
great deal of time on [the plaintiffs'] case because of the paper, mo-
tions, preparation for seventy depositions, trial preparation, and
complex issues involved. He further explained that [plaintiffs'] attor-
neys did not keep hourly time sheets because they were under a con-
tingent fee contract, not an agreement based on an hourly fee...
Having heard [plaintiffs' expert's] testimony, the jury awarded fees
in a specific dollar amount, as requested in the charge. [Plaintiffs'
expert's] coverage of the factors stated in Arthur Andersen, including
the suggestion that the dollar amount be based on the contingent fee,
are sufficient evidence to support the award of attorneys' fees. Ac-
cordingly, we overrule [defendant's] tenth issue and hold that there
was legally sufficient evidence of reasonable and necessary attor-
neys' fees.63
This extraordinary fee award-particularly in light of the complete ab-
sence of time records-is noteworthy. 64
The general rule in suits that involve successful and unsuccessful DTPA
claims, is that an allocation of fees between the successful and unsuccess-
ful claims is required unless there is a substantial overlap among the
claims. 65 This rule was recently addressed by the Austin Court of Ap-
peals, which, in the context of upholding the district court's fee award,
stated that "considering the nature of the DTPA, contract, negligence,
and defamation claims as well as the various parties and their time in-
volved in the suit, we conclude that appellees' prosecution of the claims
necessitated proof of essentially the same facts. Thus, the district court
was correct in not requiring segregation of attorney's fees. ",66
2. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Defendant
The DTPA also mandates an award of attorneys' fees to a defendant
when the consumer's suit is found to be "groundless in fact or law or
brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment. ' 67
The existence of bad faith, groundlessness, or harassment is determined
62. Id. at 263.
63. Id. (internal citation omitted). Because the underlying damages award was signifi-
cantly reduced by the court of appeals, this court ultimately remanded for a determination
by the trial court whether the $8.9 million award of attorneys' fees was still reasonable in
light of this reduction.
64. Id.; see also Valley Nissan, Inc. v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 702, 714 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.) (stating that "[a]n attorney's testimony concerning the time spent and
the attorney's hourly charge is considered reasonably sufficient evidence to support an
attorney's fee award" and upholding the jury's award of $32,000 as "not unreasonable").
65. See Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc. v. Hamrick, 125 S.W.3d 555, 555 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (emphasis added).
67. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 2002); see also Gonzales v.




by the court, not the jury.68 These terms are not expressly defined in the
DTPA, but the Texas Supreme Court has applied the definition of Rule
13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to define "groundless" for pur-
poses of the DTPA as a suit with "no basis in law or fact and not war-
ranted by good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law."'69
Specific findings of bad faith, groundlessness, or harassment are neces-
sary. Recently, in Gonzales v. American Title Co. of Houston,70 the
Houston (First District) Court of Appeals determined that the defendant
had not met its burden of obtaining a prerequisite finding by the trial
court that the suit by the borrowers was groundless in fact or law, made in
bad faith, or brought for the purposes of harassment and thus fees were
not warranted. 71
For a defendant, a well-drafted settlement offer letter provides the best
opportunity to either recover attorneys' fees or limit its liability for the
consumer's attorneys' fees in the event the consumer is ultimately suc-
cessful. Under Section 17.5052, if the defendant's settlement offer turns
out to be the same, substantially the same, or more than the amount of
damages found by the trier of fact, the consumer's attorneys fees are lim-
ited to the amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees incurred
before the date and time of the rejected settlement offer. 72 Furthermore,
if the defendant's settlement offer is made for the full amount requested
by the consumer in the notice, but the consumer rejects the offer, the
rejection is evidence that the suit was brought for the purpose of harass-
ment, and the defendant may be able to recover its attorneys' fees from
the consumer under Section 17.50(c), even if the case has merit-mean-
ing the cause is not "groundless, 73
D. OTHER STATUTES PERMITrNG THE RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES
This year's Survey also includes a discussion of statutes allowing the
recovery of attorneys' fees in securities, insurance, intellectual property,
antitrust, and covenant not to compete cases.
68. § 17.50(c); Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.
1989).
69. § 17.50(c). While no case found discusses definitions of "bad faith" and "harass-
ment," in other contracts, "bad faith" is defined as "indicia of improper motive, such as ill
will, spite, malice, reckless disregard, or dishonesty. See McDuffie v. Blassingame, 883
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied); Holeman v. Landmark Chevrolet
Corp., 989 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Zak v. Parks,
729 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Transport Indem. Co. v.
Orgain, Bell & Tucker, 846 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993), writ denied per
curiam, 856 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1993). The term "harassment," is commonly found to mean
annoyance, irritation, or disturbance; however, no Texas case found explicitly discusses or
adopts this common definition. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 717 (7th ed. 1990).
70. Gonzales, 104 S.W.3d at 599.
71. Id.
72. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(h) (Vernon 2002).
73. See Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 638.
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1. Recovering Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Upon the termination of a shareholder derivative lawsuit, Texas courts
are empowered to award "expenses" incurred by one or both of the par-
ties. 74 The term expenses is expressly defined in the statute to include
"the reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of a derivative proceed-
ing, including without limitation: (a) attorney's fees; (b) costs in pursuing
an investigation of the matter that was the subject of the derivative pro-
ceeding; and (c) expenses for which the domestic or foreign corporation
or a corporate defendant may be required to indemnify another per-
son."'75 There is little case law interpreting Article 5.14J. However, the
language of the statute and the limited case law that does exist interpret-
ing the same make clear that depending on the evidence either one-or
all-of the parties can collect attorneys' fees in a derivative action.
a. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Derivative Plaintiff in a
Derivative Action
Article 5.14J(1)(a) allows a trial court, in its discretion, to award a
prevailing plaintiff legal fees if the proceeding results in a "substantial
benefit" to the corporation. 76 Further, a plaintiff may also recover fees
from a corporation under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific improper filings
by the corporation.77
b. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Corporation in a Derivative
Action
Article 5.14J(1)(b) allows a Texas court to, in its discretion, require the
plaintiff to pay these expenses if the court finds that the derivative pro-
ceeding was "commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for
74. Article 5.14J of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides that the court may
order:
(a) the domestic or foreign corporation to pay the expenses of the plaintiff
incurred in the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding has resulted in a
substantial benefit to the domestic or foreign corporation; (b) the plaintiff to
pay the expenses of the domestic or foreign corporation or any defendant
incurred in investigating and defending the proceeding if it finds that the
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for
an improper purpose; or (c) a party to pay the expenses incurred by another
party (including the domestic or foreign corporation) because of the filing of
a pleading, motion, or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion, or
other paper (i) was not well grounded in fact after reasonable inquiry, (ii)
was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, or (iii) was interposed for an im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r art. 5.14 § J (Vernon 2002).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r art. 5.14 § J(1)(a); Rowe v. Rowe, 887 S.W.2d 191, 198(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) ("Attorney's fees are only recoverable by a
successful plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit."); see also Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797
S.W.2d 304, 315 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
77. TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r art. 5.14 § J(1)(c).
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an improper purpose. '78
The phrase "without reasonable cause" is not defined in the statute. In
Bass v. Walker, the Houston (Fourteenth District) Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed the meaning of this phrase in upholding the trial court's award of
attorneys' fees to a closely held corporation. 79 There, plaintiffs brought a
derivative action on behalf of Ellington Dirt, a closely held corporation
formed for the purpose of acquiring land and leasing this land to another
closely held corporation, defendant Walker Sand, Inc.80 Ellington Dirt
and Walker Sand, Inc. shared a common president and principal share-
holder at all relevant times.81 As alleged in plaintiffs' original petition,
defendants (Walker Sand, Inc. and its president) made use of the relevant
land for their own financial gain and subjected the owner of the land
(Ellington Dirt) to increased liability due to unauthorized dumping of
possible hazardous waste on the property.82 The plaintiffs later amended
their petition to include a breach of contract claim against Walker Sand
and certain other defendants for their alleged breach of the original lease
contract. 83
On the second day of trial, the plaintiffs settled their claim for the al-
leged breach of the original lease for $150,000-all of which went to El-
lington Dirt.84 Before the remaining claims were sent to the jury, the
court granted a directed verdict in favor of the remaining defendants on
all but one claim, and the jury thereafter returned a verdict in favor of
defendants on this remaining claim. 85 Thus, other than the settled claim,
defendants ultimately prevailed on all claims. 86
After trial, pursuant to Article 5.14F, the trial court awarded fees in the
amount of $411,499.00 to Ellington Dirt.8 7 The court of appeals upheld
this award and the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs brought the de-
rivative action "without reasonable cause."'8 8 In so doing, it rejected
plaintiffs' contention that the determination whether an action is brought
78. See TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr art. 5.14J(1)(b). The previous version of Article 5.14
was somewhat ambiguous with respect to whether the court or the jury should ultimately
decide whether the proceeding was brought without reasonable cause. Econ. Gas, Inc. v.
Burke, No. 14-93-01016-CV, 1996 WL 220903, at *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
May 2, 1996, writ denied) (concurring and dissenting opinion) ("[T]he statute, by its plain
and unambiguous terms, allows 'a finding' of reasonable cause to be made by the court or
jury.") However, the 1997 amendments to the statute make clear that the court, not the
jury, is to make such determination. See Campbell v. Walker, No. 14-96-01425-CV, 2000
WL 19143, at * 3-6 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.) (holding deter-
mination to be made by court).
79. Bass v. Walker, 99 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied).
80. Id. at 880.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 881-82.
85. Id. at 882.
86. Id.




"without reasonable cause" for purposes of Article 5.14F is a subjective
inquiry, stating instead that,
[A]fter considering the language of Article 5.14F and the legal stan-
dards under other similar statutes, we adopt an objective standard
and hold that a plaintiff acts without reasonable cause under Article
5.14F if, at the time he brings suit: (1) plaintiff's claims in the lawsuit
are not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; or (2) plaintiff's
allegations in the suit are not well grounded in fact after reasonable
inquiry.89
Under this objective standard, the court of appeals found legally and
factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the
plaintiffs brought the derivative action without reasonable cause.90 Sig-
nificant for the purposes of this finding was the fact that the only claim
with apparent merit-the claim that the original lease had been breached
by Walker Sand and certain other defendants-was not included in the
original complaint.91 Rather, the original claims related solely to allega-
tions of illegal dumping and "significant environmental liability," and
since, as to these allegations, the plaintiffs had not tested or properly
evaluated the potential environmental liability, the finding of no reasona-
ble cause was upheld as proper.92 The court continued,
The settlement . . . is not material to whether the [plaintiffs] had
reasonable cause to bring suit against . . . because that settlement
involved different defendants and occurred after the [plaintiffs]
brought suit. Though the [plaintiffs] took some steps before suit to
investigate the dumping, this investigation showed only that materi-
als . . . had been dumped, not that this material was hazardous or
toxic or was likely to give rise to environmental liability. Likewise,
though the [plaintiffs'] conversations with [defendants] and their
statements at two meetings of shareholders show their concern that
there might be some risk of environmental liability because of the
dumping of . . . materials, these conversations are not strong evi-
dence of a reasonable prefiling inquiry concerning the nature and
extent, if any, of that liability.93
Thus, for purposes of assessing whether a derivative suit is brought with-
out reasonable cause, the court looks objectively at the evidence available
to a derivative plaintiff before the original petition is filed.94
Additionally, the corporation-like the derivative plaintiff in the case
of the corporation's filings-can recover fees from the derivative plaintiff
under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific improper filings by the derivative
89. Id. at 885 (emphasis added).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 885-86.
92. Id. at 886.




plaintiff. 95 Thus, the statute appears to grant the corporation the right to
test all of the pleadings, motions, and other papers filed by the derivative
plaintiff to determine if any such filing: (1) was not well grounded in fact
after reasonable inquiry; (2) was not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
or (3) was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.96
2. Receiving Attorneys' Fees in Connection with the Sale or Issuance of
a Security
a. Article 581-33
Article 581-33(A)(2) of the Texas Securities Act ("TSA") creates liabil-
ity for sellers of securities under certain circumstances. 97 Similarly, a
buyer is liable to the seller under Article 581-33(B) of the TSA when he
buys securities "by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission to state a material fact," 98 and pursuant to both sections of Arti-
cle 581-33, the injured party may be awarded court costs and reasonable
and necessary attorneys' fees to the extent the court considers such award
"equitable." 99
Recently, in Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Hakim Daccach, the
Austin Court of Appeals addressed what circumstances constitute "equi-
table" circumstances for purposes of awarding fees under the TSA.1°°
The trial court certified a class of non-resident insureds who were sold life
insurance policies from within the state by an unregistered dealer of se-
curities. 01 In opposing this certification to the court of appeals, the de-
fendants noted that the commentary to the TSA recommends that a court
consider individual circumstances-such as the conduct of the parties in
making the transaction, the conduct of both parties in the lawsuit,
whether the defendant benefited from the violation, and fiduciary rela-
tionships-when adjudicating equitable circumstances warranting the
award of fees under the TSA and that consideration of these issues could
result in individual issues predominating over common issues if the plain-
tiff class was ultimately successful. 102
95. Article 5.14J(1)(c).
96. Article 5.14J(1)(c).
97. In relevant part, article 581-33(A)(2) states,
[A] person who offers or sells a security... by means of an untrue statement
of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading, is liable to the person buying the security from
him, who may sue either at law or equity for rescission, or for damages if the
buyer no longer owns the security.
98. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 581-33(B) (Vernon 2003).
99. Id. art. 581-33(D)(7).
100. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hakim Daccach, 105 S.W.3d 712, 726 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, pet. filed).




The court of appeals rejected the defendants' argument, stating that the
defendants focused "too literally on the commentary" to the TSA, which
the court described as "being only persuasive. ' 10 3 The court recognized
that "circumstances" which might make the recovery of attorneys' fees
"equitable" for purposes of the TSA "could involve individualized issues
of misrepresentation, reliance, or the subjective knowledge of the policy
holders,"'1 4 but held that "here, because the heart of the dispute turns on
whether the jury decides that the [insurance] policies constitute securities
and whether they were sold from Texas, 'the conduct of each party to
each of the underlying transactions' appears altogether irrelevant."
' 10 5
Finally, the court noted that "the jury will not be presented with an
'overwhelming task' because the court rather than the jury will consider
the circumstances that would make recovery of attorneys' fees equita-
ble." 0 6 This case thus reaffirms the rule that the court, not the jury, de-
termines whether a fee recovery is "equitable" for purposes of awarding
attorneys' fees under the TSA, and also sheds light on the fact-specific
nature of the inquiry required to determine what circumstances would
make a fee recovery equitable.
b. Article 581-33-1
The TSA also creates liability for the activities of investment advisors
and their representatives. 10 7 Under Article 581-33-1, investment advisors
who engage in fraud, or fraudulent practices in rendering their services
are liable to the purchaser for damages including, "to the extent the court
considers equitable, court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."' 0 8 While
no case found interprets this provision, it stands to reason that, since the
language of Article 581-33-1 is virtually identical to the language of Arti-
cle 581-33, the above-referenced cases are highly persuasive regarding
what constitutes "equitable" circumstances and "reasonable and neces-
sary" fees.
3. Recovering Fees in Insurance-Related Cases
There are three widely-utilized statutes providing for the award of at-
torneys' fees to insured parties when an insurer is found to have engaged
in certain prohibited acts. 10 9
103. Id.
104. Id. at 726.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 726.
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 581-33-1 (Vernon 2002).
108. Id.
109. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.21, 21.55 & 21.21-2. Recovery of attorneys' fees may
also be allowed to an insured or insurer for breach of the insurance contract. TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001. In Texas, an insurance agreement constitutes a "writ-
ten contract." See Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. 1987). Sec-
tion 38.006 provides that, "[t]his chapter does not apply to a contract issued by an insurer
that is subject to the provisions of... (4) Article 21.21, Insurance Code, or (5) The Unfair
Claim Settlement Practices Act (Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code)." TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
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a. Recovering Attorneys' Fees For An Insurers' Failure to Promptly
Pay Claims
Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code establishes procedures for
the prompt payment of insurance claims and creates a private right of
action for an insured against an insurer that fails to promptly respond to
and pay for claims by insured parties. 110 The damages recoverable by an
insured pursuant to Article 21.55 include a discretionary award of "rea-
sonable attorneys' fees."1 '
For an insurer to be liable under Article 21.55 for failing to respond to
or pay a claim promptly, the insured party must establish three elements:
(1) a claim under the insurance policy, (2) the insurer is liable for the
claim, and (3) the insurer has failed to follow one or more sections of
Article 21.55 with respect to the claim. 112 While Texas courts have held
that Article 21.55 should be construed broadly, so as to provide the maxi-
mum protection for the insured party,113 no recovery is allowed without a
clear finding that coverage under the underlying policy exists and the in-
surer is liable on the relevant claim.' 14 Further, the statute defines the
term "claim" narrowly as "a first party claim made by an insured or a
policyholder under an insurance policy ... that must be paid by the in-
surer directly to the insured or beneficiary.' 1 5 Thus, at least explicitly,
third party claims-for instance, claims made against an insurer for in-
demnity against a third party-may not be subject to Article 21.55
coverage." 16
If an insurer delays payment of a claim within the statutory time period
(or, indeed, even if the insurer wrongfully rejects a claim), the insurer may
REM. CODE ANN. § 38.006 (Vernon 2002). However, on certification from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court recently clarified
that courts should follow "established and longstanding Texas authority that interprets Sec-
tion 38.006 to allow recovery of attorney's fees in successful breach-of-contract action
against an insurer unless attorney's fees are otherwise available." Grapevine Excavation,
Inc. v. Maryland Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2000).
110. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon 2002).
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. James, -S.W.3d -, No. 05-01-01372-
CV, 2003 WL 1848601, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 10, 2003, no pet.) (setting for the
three elements and overruling claim for attorneys' fees where the insurer was found not to
be liable).
113. See DeLeon v. Lloyd's London, Certain Underwriters, 259 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir.
2001).
114. See Evergreen Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Tan It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669, 678-79 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
115. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. article 21.55, § 1.
116. But see Ernest Martin, Jr., Article 21.21 and Other Statutory Claims: Staying on Top
of New Devs., (Mar. 30, 2001), available at http://www.haynesandboone.com. Mr. Martin
argues that some claims of an insured party under a commercial general liability policy are
actually first party claims that should be covered under article 21.21. As stated, this view
has case support. See, e.g., Luxury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. H-02-3166,
2003 WL 22116202, at *19-21 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2003, no pet.) ("Mid-Continent has a duty
to defend Luxury and to reimburse Luxury for its reasonable defense costs to date in the
underlying lawsuit, including statutory penalty under article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance
Code, along with reasonable attorneys fees in this action.").
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be liable for statutory damages, including attorneys' fees.117 Farmers In-
surance Exchange v. Neal, demonstrates how fraught with peril wrong-
fully rejecting a claim, even in apparent good faith, can be in the wake of
Article 21.55.118 There, a homeowner brought suit against his insurer af-
ter the insurer denied coverage for two race cars destroyed in a home
fire. 119 The insurer argued that the cars were expressly excluded (under
the motor vehicle exclusion) from the homeowner's policy and that, in
any event, the homeowner had not given the insurer notice that these cars
were kept in the homeowner's garage; the insured homeowner argued the
vehicles fell within the "recreation" exception to the motor vehicle exclu-
sion. 120 The trial court agreed with the insured and ordered the insurer to
pay $41,854.40 as a penalty of non-compliance with Article 21.55 and
$14,004.26 in attorneys' fees. 121
While noting the "unfortunate position" of the insurer, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals affirmed, stating,
Although reasonable minds may differ in their view of what consti-
tutes a recreational activity or, more specifically, what is encom-
passed in the phrase "vehicles used for recreational purposes," it is
Farmers' unfortunate position to have state-approved or state-
promulgated forms to use in its homeowners policies that employ
that rather elastic language ... courts must also adopt the construc-
tion of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as that
construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by
the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflec-
tion of the parties' intent. 122
b. Recovering Attorneys' Fees For An Insurer's Unfair
Competition and Unfair Practices
Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code provides for an insured to
recover his or her "reasonable and necessary" attorneys' fees, in the dis-
cretion of the trial court, if the insurer is found to have engaged in unfair
competition and practices, including misleading advertising, unfair settle-
ment of the insured party's claims, or misrepresenting the contents of an
insurance policy. 123 Several factors are relevant to the determination
whether the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Article 21.21 are reason-
117. E & R Rubalcava Constr., Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that insured party is entitled to attorneys' fees award from in-
surer under article 21.55) (citing Teate v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 965 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Tex.
1997)). An insurer's wrongful rejection of a claim may be also considered a delay in pay-
ment for the purposes of article 21.55. Id.; see also Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Columbia Packing
Co., No. 3-02-CV-0909-BD, 2003 WL 21516586, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2003) ("The
wrongful rejection of a claim, even if make in good faith, may be considered a delay...").
118. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal, 120 S.W.3d 493, 494 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no
pet.).
119. Id. at 493.
120. Id. at 494-95.
121. Id. at 494 n.1.
122. Id. at 497 (internal quotation and citation omitted and emphasis added).
123. In relevant part, Article 21.21 provides,
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able and necessary, one of the most important of which is the amount of
damages ultimately awarded. 124
In Northwinds Abatement Inc. v. Employers Insurance, the Fifth Circuit
discussed how to calculate "reasonable and necessary" attorneys' fees
when the insured party has entered into a contingency fee arrangement
with his attorney. 125 The court held that when counsel and client have
entered into a contingency fee arrangement, Texas law requires the finder
of fact to calculate an award of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees
as a dollar amount rather than as a percentage of recovery. 126 In so do-
ing, it borrowed the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of a fee-shift-
ing provision of the DTPA for use in the Article 21.21 context, stating
that "[t]here is no reason why the Insurance Code's fee-shifting provision
should be treated differently.' '12 7
c. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees For An Insurer's Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices
Article 21.21-2 of the Texas Insurance Code now provides for the re-
covery of attorneys' fees by an insured if his or her insurer is found to
have engaged in unfair claim settlement practices, such as knowingly
making misrepresentations to claimants, failing to investigate claims
properly, or failing to settle certain claims properly. 128 As noted by the
Texas Supreme Court in Rocor International, Inc. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co., "Article 21.21 now expressly incorporates the unfair set-
tlement practice defined in Article 21.21-2, ' '129 and establishes liability if
the insured shows (1) the policy covers the claim, (2) the insured's liabil-
ity is reasonably clear, and (3) the claimant has made a proper settlement
demand within policy limits, and (4) the demand's terms are such that an
[A]ny person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's engag-
ing in an act or practice declared . . . to be unfair methods of competition or
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, may main-
tain an action . . . and may recover... the amount of actual damages plus
court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 262 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no
pet. h.) (remanding for a specific determination whether the attorneys' fees awarded were
reasonable); Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Int'l Supply Co, 759 S.W.2d 697, 703-04 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, writ denied) (detailing twelve factors normally used in determining reasonableness of
an award of attorneys' fees).
125. Northwinds Abatements, Inc. v. Employers Ins., 258 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2001).
126. Id. at 354. The court then considered the complexity of the litigation and awarded
attorneys' fees of $712,000 to the insured party, which was more than nine times the actual
damage award. Id. at 354-55.
127. Id. ("In situations where counsel and client have entered into a contingency fee
arrangement, Texas law required the finder of fact to calculate a statutorily-founded award
of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees as a dollar amount rather than a percentage of
the overall recovery.") (citing Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d
812, 818 (Tex. 1997)).
128. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2.
129. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Tex. 2002) (find-
ing no violation of Article 21.21 because the injured third party never made a proper settle-
ment demand within the policy limits).
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ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it.130 Further, "although Article
21.21-2 does not itself create a private cause of action," the Texas Su-
preme Court has held "that conduct violating Article 21.21-2 [i]s actiona-
ble under Article 21.21. ' '131
4. Recovering Fees in Intellectual Property Cases
Chapter 16 of the Code provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees in
certain trademark infringement matters.' 32 Section 16.25 allows a person
who believes he or she will be damaged by the registration of a trademark
to bring suit to cancel such registration. 133 If the court decides that the
losing party in a case arising under this section "should have known his
position was without merit, the court may award the successful party his
reasonable attorneys' fees and charge them as a part of the costs against
the losing party. ' 134
Similarly, Section 16.28 of the Code allows a Texas court to, in its dis-
cretion, award attorneys' fees when a party is found to have knowingly
made a fraudulent representation when applying for a trademark 135 or
procured an application or registration by false or fraudulent means. 136
5. Recovering Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Cases
The Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 ("TFEAA") pro-
vides for the recovery of attorneys' fees to "[a]ny person or governmental
entity" whose "business or property has been injured by reason of any
conduct declared unlawful under the TFEAA. '
137
130. Id. at 255.
131. Id. at 259.
132. As set forth below, Texas law provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in certain
trademark related cases. Reasonable attorney's fees are also recoverable in trade secrets
cases when the claim arises as a breach of contract, subject to all of the limitations de-
scribed in Section 38.001. See Murrco Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d at 606.
133. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.25(a) (Vernon 2002).
134. Id. § 16.25(d) (emphasis added).
135. Id. § 16.28(a).
136. Id. § 16.28(b)(1). Federal law also provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees in
certain intellectual property matters. For example, the federal trademark statute permits a
court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in "exceptional cases."
See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (1998); Martin's Herend
Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296, 1305 (5th Cir. 1997);
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 555 (5th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the fed-
eral patent statute provides for the award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in "excep-
tional cases." 35 U.S.C.A § 285 (1994); Arbrook, Inc. v. Am. Hosp. Supply Corp., 645 F.2d
273, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1981). ("The purpose of § 285 is to prevent gross injustice, and an
award under that statute requires an unambiguous showing of extraordinary
misconduct.").
137. In relevant part, Section 15.21(a)(1) of the TFEAA provides:
Any person or governmental entity, including the State of Texas and any of
its political subdivisions or tax-supported institutions, whose business or
property has been injured by reason of any conduct declared unlawful in
Subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 15.05 of this Act may sue any person,
other than a municipal corporation, .... and shall recover actual damages
sustained, interest on actual damages ... and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee; provided, however, that if the trier of fact finds
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The award of "costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees" is
mandatory under the TFEAA, but a prerequisite to this recovery is an
award of actual damages under the statute.138 However, the TFEAA ex-
pressly provides for the award of attorneys' fees in favor of a party who
substantially prevails on the merits of his or her suit for injunctive relief
under the TFEAA.139
Importantly, Section 15.21(a)(2) precludes a party from recovering
damages under the TFEAA when a judgment has been obtained under
federal antitrust law and the state TFEAA action is based upon substan-
tially the same conduct which was the subject of the federal sUit. 140
The TFEAA also provides for the mandatory award of "reasonable
attorney's fees, courts costs and other reasonable expenses of litigation"
if an action is found by the court to be groundless, brought in bad faith, or
brought for the purpose of harassment. 141
6. Recovering Attorneys' Fees to Enforce Covenants Not to
Compete
Chapter 15 of the Code additionally permits, in the discretion of the
trial court, the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred by an employer in de-
fending an action to enforce a covenant not to compete, 142 and permits,
that the unlawful conduct was willful or flagrant, it shall increase the recov-
ery to threefold the damages sustained and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(1). Federal antitrust laws, including the Sher-
man Act, Clayton Act or the Robinson-Patman Act, also provide for the award of attor-
neys' fees. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15.
138. See Chapman Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Franks, 732 SW.2d 737, 743 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ); Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. In relevant part, Section 15.21(b) of the TFEAA provides,
Any person or governmental entity, including the State of Texas and any of
its political subdivisions or tax-supported institutions, whose business or
property is threatened with injury by reason of anything declared unlawful in
Subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 15.05 of this Act may sue any person,
other than a municipal corporation .... to enjoin the unlawful practice tem-
porarily or permanently .... In any such suit in which the plaintiff substan-
tially prevails on the merits, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee based on the fair market value
of the attorney services used.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(b).
140. In relevant part, Section 15.21(a)(2) of the TFEAA provides,
Any person or governmental entity who obtains a judgment for damages
under 15 U.S.C. § 15 or any other provision of federal law comparable to this
subsection may not recover damages in a suit under this subsection based on
substantially the same conduct that was the subject of the federal suit.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(2).
141. In relevant part, Section 15.21(a)(3) of the TFEAA, provides,
On a finding by the court that an action under this section was groundless or
brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award
to the defendant or defendants a reasonable attorney's fee, court costs, and
other reasonable expenses of litigation.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(3).
142. In relevant part, Section 15.51(b) of the Code provides,
[Vol. 57
Attorneys' Fees
also in the discretion of the trial court, an employee who has entered into
an unreasonable covenant not to compete to recover fees incurred in de-
fending against his or her employer. 143 Both recovery provisions fall
within the ambit of the Covenant Not to Compete Act.' 44
As with the other statutes addressed in this article, there is generally a
duty-absent a showing that claims are intertwined-to segregate fees
attributable to claims arising under the Covenant Not to Compete Act
from those not covered by the Act. 145
If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is
to obligate the promisor to render personal services, the agreement that the
covenant did not contain limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope
of activity to be restrained that were reasonable and the limitations imposed
a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill or other business
interest of the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant to
a greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill or other business
interest of the promisee, the court may award the promisor the costs, includ-
ing reasonable attorney's fees, actually and reasonably incurred by the prom-
isor in defending the action to enforce the covenant.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(b).
143. In relevant part, Section 15.51(c) of the Code provides,
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of
activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, ex-
cept that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the
covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall
be limited to injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the agreement to
which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal
services, the promisor establishes that the promisee knew at the time of the
execution of the agreement that the covenant de not contain limitations as to
time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that were rea-
sonable and the limitations imposed a greater restraint than necessary to pro-
tect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, and the promisee
sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than was necessary to
protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the court may
award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, actually
and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action to enforce
the covenant.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (emphasis added); see Alex
Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 124 S.W.3d 678, 680 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003,
no pet. h.).
144. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.51 (Vernon 2002).
145. Emergicare Sys. Corp. v. Bourdon, 942 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1997, no writ). In an action involving more than one covenant not to compete where one
covenant is found valid and the other void, the court in Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods,
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) held that remand was nec-
essary to determine what portion of the awarded attorney's fees were attributable to the
enforcement of a valid covenant not to compete and what portion was not recoverable for
the enforcement of a covenant found to be void and unenforceable such that segregation
could be accomplished. Id. at 774-75 (citing Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla
Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1975); Pelto Oil Corp. v. CSX Oil & Gas Corp., 804
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Indus. Disposal Supply Co.
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In Perez v. Texas Disposal Systems, Inc., the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals addressed whether a trial court's award of attorneys' fees under
Section 15.51(b) to an employer after reforming the employer's covenant
not to compete contained in the employer's employment contract with its
former employees was appropriate.1 46 The appellate court found that
Section 15.51's "silence on whether an employer can recover attorney's
fees if a covenant not to compete has been reformed is significant because
of the specificity with which Section 15.51 addresses the recovery availa-
ble to employers and employees in an action to enforce a covenant not to
compete, ' 147 and therefore held that "[i]f the covenant not to compete
does not meet the Section 15.50 criteria and the trial court reforms the
covenant, a court may award an employer injunctive relief only."'1 48
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff-employer had additionally sought attorneys' fees pursu-
ant to Section 38.001(8) of the Code (the breach of contract statute), and
that the court of appeals erred in not addressing whether attorneys' fees
were recoverable pursuant to this alternative basis. 149
On remand from the Texas Supreme Court, the court held that the
Covenant Not to Compete Act "preempts an award of attorney's fees
under any other statute," including Section 38.001.150 In so holding, it re-
jected as unpersuasive, Williams v. Compressor Engineering Corp., a 1986
opinion of the Houston Court of Appeals awarding attorneys' fees to an
employer pursuant to Section 38.001 after reforming the scope of a cove-
nant not to compete.151 The court stated that Williams may no longer
apply because it was decided before the Covenant Not to Compete Act
was enacted in 1989.152 Instead, the court found the preemption lan-
guage contained in the Covenant Not to Compete Act to be disposi-
tive. 153 Thus, just as the court of appeals' initial opinion strictly construed
v. Perryman Bros. Trash Serv., Inc., 664 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
146. Perez v. Tex. Disposal Sys., 53 S.W.3d 480, 482-83 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001),
rev'd on other grounds, 80 S.W.3d 593 (2002).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381,
388 (Tex. 1991)).
149. Tex. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Perez, 80 S.W.3d 593, 594 (Tex. 2002).
150. Perez v. Tex. Disposal Sys., Inc., 103 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2003, pet. denied) (emphasis in original).
151. Williams v. Compressor Eng'g Corp., 704 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Butler v. Arrow Miller & Glass, Inc, 51 S.W.3d
787, 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (relying on Williams to award at-
torneys' fees pursuant to Section 38.001 in a covenant not to compete case).
152. Perez, 103 S.W.3d at 592.
153. Id. This preemption language is found at Section 15.52 of the Code and, in rele-
vant part, states,
The criteria for enforceability of a covenant not to compete provided by Sec-
tion 15.50 of this code and the procedures and remedies in an action to en-
force a covenant not to compete provided by Section 15.51 of this code are
exclusive and preempt any other criteria for enforceability of a covenant not
to compete or procedures and remedies in an action to enforce a covenant
not to compete under common law or otherwise.
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the Covenant Not to Compete Act's attorney fee provision (Sec-
tion 15.51(b)) to be inapplicable when any type of reformation of the
covenant was made by the trial court, this "supplemental opinion" on
remand similarly strictly construed the Covenant Not to Compete Act's
preemption language, stating:
We also strictly construe Section 15.52's language that the "remedies
in an action to enforce a covenant not to compete provided by Sec-
tion 15.51 of this code are exclusive and preempt any other ... reme-
dies in an action to enforce a covenant not to compete under
common law or otherwise." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.52.
Just as the Act's criteria for enforcing a covenant not to compete
preempt other law, so do the remedies provided under the Act. See
CRC-Evans Pipeline Int'l, Inc. v. Myers, 927 S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (Act governs enforceability
of covenants not to compete, as well as procedures and remedies in
an action such as this one). Accordingly, we hold that the Act con-
trols the award of attorney's fees, and Section 15.52 preempts an
award of fees under any other law.' 54
The plaintiff-employer's petition for review of this supplemental opinion
was denied by the Texas Supreme Court. An account of the persuasive-
ness of the San Antonio Court of Appeals' supplemental opinion will
have to await next year's survey. However, the Texas Supreme Court has
stated, in the context of addressing an illegal restraint of trade argument,
that the Covenant Not to Compete Act's preemption provision "makes
clear that the [Texas] Legislature intended the Covenant Not to Compete
Act to largely supplant the Texas common law relating to enforcement of
covenants not to compete," and thus the strict construction of Sec-
tion 15.51 in this supplemental opinion is supported by precedent. 155
E. RECOVERING FEES IN CLASS ACTION CASES
a. Enactment of Rule 26.003
Effective September 1, 2003, in all state court class action cases, the
"lodestar" method must be used to calculate attorneys' fees for class
counsel.156 The newly enacted Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Section 26.003 provides:
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.52 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
154. Id. at 593-94.
155. Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1994).
156. Changes were also made to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Section 23(h). Sec-
tion 23(h) provides the procedural mechanism and requirements for an attorneys' fee
award in a federal class action where such an award is allowed by law or an agreement of
the parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The Advisory Committee makes clear that this
provision does not create a new basis for attorneys' fees which is not otherwise available
under statute, case law, or agreement. Order of the United States Supreme Court Adopt-
ing and Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158, 231 (2003). A
party seeking attorneys' fees in a federal class action must file a motion under Rule
54(d)(2). Notice of the motion must be served on all parties and on the class. Id. at
23(h)(1). Any class member may object to the motion, and the court may hold a hearing,
but must place findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. Id. Finally, the court
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(a) If an award of attorneys' fees is available under applicable sub-
stantive law, the rules adopted under this chapter must provide that
the trial court shall use the Lodestar method to calculate the amount
of attorneys' fees to be awarded class counsel. The rules may give
the trial court discretion to increase or decrease the fee award calcu-
lated by using the Lodestar method by no more than four times
based on specified factors.
(b) Rules adopted under this chapter must provide that in a class
action, if any portion of the benefits recovered for the class are in the
form of coupons or other noncash common benefits, the attorneys'
fees awarded in the action must be in cash and noncash amounts in
the same proportion as the recovery for the class. 157
Section 26.003 expressly allows Texas courts to use a multiplier to en-
hance fees awarded to class counsel. 158 However, the trial court is limited
to a multiplier of four times the lodestar.159
Prior to the enactment of Section 26.003 the trial court had discretion
to use either the percentage method or the lodestar method in awarding
class action fees. 160 Section 26.003 impliedly overrules previous Texas au-
thority that permitted an attorneys' fee award to class counsel based on
the "percentage method."'161
An equally significant change in practice is the provision of Sec-
tion 26.003 requiring class counsel to be compensated through cash and
non-cash benefits in equal proportion to the cash and non-cash benefits
received by the class as consideration. It is extremely rare for counsel to
accept non-cash benefits, but quite common for class members to be com-
pensated with non-cash benefits.162 Section 26.003's proportionality pro-
vision appears to significantly change this practice.
may refer the attorneys' fees motion to a special master or magistrate judge as set out in
Rule 54(d)(2)(D). See id. at 23(h)(4).
157. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 26.003 (Vernon 2002).
158. VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 870 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied; see also Allison v. Fire Ins. Exch., 98 S.W.3d 227, 262-63
(Tex. App.-Austin 2002) (following VingCard but remanding for determination of fees
based on reduction of award on prevailing claims).
159. Also, objectors to a class action settlement "are not ordinarily awarded attorneys'
fees, except where their efforts have conferred benefits on the class members generally, as
distinguished from the objectors themselves particular." Johnson v. Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366,
377 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (quoting Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D. Mass. 1998)). As the Beaumont Court of Appeals
noted, "pursuing a parallel case is not enough to require an award of attorneys' fees."
Johnson, 113 S.W.3d at 377 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying fees to
objectors counsel who pursued argument that benefited class as a whole).
160. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960 (Tex. 1996) ("Both the
percentage method and the lodestar method have their strengths and weaknesses, depend-
ing on the facts of the case."); Frost Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Constr. Co.,
110 S.W.3d 41, 43-44, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
161. See Gen. Motors, 916 S.W.2d at 960.
162. See Stassi v. Boone, No. GN200180, 2003 WL 21436995, at *21 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June
6, 2003) (unpublished opinion).
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b. The Lodestar method
The lodestar method calculates attorneys' fees by "multiplying the
number of hours expended by the attorneys by an appropriate hourly rate
determined by a variety of factors, such as the benefits obtained for the
[client], the complexity of the issues involved, the expertise of counsel,
the preclusion of other legal work due to the acceptance of the . . . suit,
and the hourly rate customarily charged in the region for similar
work. ' 163 The resulting number is called a lodestar, presumably because
the number provides a guiding point-or lodestar-in the determination
of an appropriate award. 164
After the lodestar is calculated, the court may, in its discretion, apply a
multiplier to determine the ultimate amount of attorneys' fees to be
awarded. 1 65 Multipliers are determined by factors such as the complexity
of the case, the skill of the attorney, the amount of recovery, and the
contingent nature of the case 166 and vary from case to case. As long as
the resulting fee is not unreasonable, the amount of the multiplier is
largely determined at the discretion of the trial court. Section 26.003 au-
thorizes this lodestar amount to be both increased or decreased.
At this point, there is little existing Texas case law regarding the use of
the lodestar method and multiplier. The case law that does exist under-
scores the degree of discretion afforded the trial court regarding the ap-
plication of a multiplier.
In a recent decision, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals upheld a
jury's award of nearly two times the lawyers lodestar.167 In so doing, the
court emphasized that the case was complex and involved several legal
theories, a large amount of evidence, substantial discovery and numerous
pretrial hearings, and noted that the pretrial and trial lasted two and one
half weeks168
Similarly, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals previously held that a
multiplier of 1.5 was appropriate in a case where the plaintiff was re-
quired to pierce multiple layers of corporate bureaucracy and the jury
163. Gen. Motors, 916 S.W.2d at 960 (holding that lodestar is determined by multiplying
number of hours reasonably spent by an hourly rate court deems reasonable for similarly
complex, non-contingent work); cf. Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (same); City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 956 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (same); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Flores,
955 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (same).
164. See Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorneys' Fees in Texas, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 313, 327
(1993).
165. See Guity v. C.C.I. Enter., Co., 54 S.W.3d 526, 528-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (remanding case for evaluation of reasonable fee).
166. See Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 647; Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 956.
167. Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, 100 S.W.3d 303, 316 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2002, pet. filed) (requesting multiplier of 2.0). See also Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d
817, 823 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming multiplier of 2); In re Terra-Drill P'ships Sec. Litig., 733
F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (applying 2.5 multiplier).
168. Haggar Apparel Co., 100 S.W.3d at 316.
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found for the plaintiff on all liability issues.169 In another case, the same
court of appeals held that a multiplier of two (2) was appropriate where
the case was complex and involved numerous theories of recovery, vigor-
ous discovery, a number of pre-trial hearings and a nine-day trial.170
In Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales,17 1 the El Paso Court of
Appeals affirmed a multiplier of two (2) where the case "involved novel
and complex issues" such that the controlling federal case law made the
case "not just an uphill battle, but an exercise in windmill tilting."1 72
On the other hand, in Mission Park Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. Gallegos,173
the San Antonio Court of Appeals refused to apply a multiplier of three
(3). The court stated that there "was no testimony that a jury could ap-
propriately use a multiplier to further increase attorneys' fees beyond the
amount calculated using an hourly fee approach," "there was no jury in-
struction regarding use of a multiplier," and "there is no authority for its
use in a case such as this."' 174
F. RECOVERING FEES ON OTHER EQUITABLE GROUNDS
Notwithstanding the general rule in Texas that attorneys' fees are re-
coverable only if contractual or statutory provision so permits, equitable
principles may allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees if a party is re-
quired to prosecute or defend a suit because of the "wrongful act" of its
opponent.17 5 For example, a party also may be able to recover reasona-
ble and necessary attorneys' fees and expenses as damages when the de-
fendant's wrongful conduct forced the plaintiff to prosecute or defend
169. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Flores, 955 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). Notably, in Borg-Warner, the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals upheld the use of the Lodestar method in employment discrimination cases. Id.; see
also Gorges Foodservice, Inc. v. Huerta, 964 S.W.2d 656, 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1997, pet. withdrawn) (utilizing the Lodestar method in the employment discrimination
context).
170. City of Alamo v. Espinosa, No. 13-99-704-CV, 2001 WL 1003309, at *14 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2001, pet. dism'd by agr.) (not designated for publication).
171. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 412-13 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2002, pet. denied).
172. Further, the Dillard court noted that there was ample evidence that the matter was
a "'daily basis case" and that the attorney gave up multiple other cases to work on the
matter. Id. at 413.
173. Mission Park Funeral Chapel, Inc. v. Gallegos, No. 04-00-00459-CV, 2001 WL
488007, at *5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, May 9, 2001, no pet.).
174. Id. at *5.
175. See Massey, 35 S.W.3d at 701; Baja Energy, Inc. v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 838-39
(Tex. App.-Eastland 1984, no writ); see also Brandtjen & Kluge v. Manney, 238 S.W.2d
609, 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.) but see Burnside Air Condi-
tioning & Heating, Inc. v. T.S. Young Corp., 113 S.W.3d 889, 898-99 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.), Ed Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, 117 S.W.3d 348, 357-58 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003) ("Neither the Texas Supreme Court nor this Court has adopted any wrongful
act exception to the general prohibition against recovery of attorneys' fees in a tort claim,
as we decline to do so in this case."); Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes, Inc., 86
S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68 S.W.3d 793,
797 n. 2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Notably, while several courts
of appeal have adopted this exception, the Texas Supreme Court has not done so. Ed
Rachal Found., 117 S.W.3d at 357-58.
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another proceeding. 17 6 Texas courts have equitably extended Section
38.001 (authorizing the recovery of fees in breach of contract actions) to
cover certain claims sounding in tort.177
The common fund doctrine is the most widely recognized exception to
the general rule that, absent a statutory or contractual basis for an award
of attorney's fees, each litigant must bear his own attorney's fees. 178
"Under the common fund doctrine, the court may allow reasonable attor-
ney's fees to a litigant who, at his own expense, has maintained a suit
which creates a fund benefiting other parties as well as himself. ' 179
The common fund doctrine is based on the principle that those receiv-
ing the benefits of the suit should bear their fair share of the expenses. 8 0
Attorneys' fees are allowed as a charge against the fund.)8 ' An attor-
ney's compensation from non-contracting plaintiffs under the common
fund doctrine is limited to the reasonable value of the attorney's services
benefiting them.182 As long as the litigant has created a fund for others, it
need only establish that others have benefited to seek fees from the fund
based on the common fund doctrine. 183
The common fund doctrine was previously generally utilized in class
actions. 8 4 It is not expressly mentioned in Section 26.003. Since Texas
must now use the lodestar approach in the context of class action cases, it
is likely that the common fund doctrine will continue to hear all applica-
tion in this area of law.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECOVERY OF
ATFORNEYS' FEES
Assuming that an attorney has the right-whether by contract, statute,
or in equity-to recover attorneys' fees, the amount of the fee must be
"reasonable." A fee is unconscionable, and thus, unreasonable, "if a
176. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 317 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet.
denied); see also Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 15, 32-33
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. filed); McCall v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 82 S.W.3d 337, 344
(Tex. App.-Austin 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2003).
177. See Gill Say., 797 S.W.2d at 31; Tex. Beef Cattle, 883 S.W.2d at 430.
178. City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 954 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ de-
nied); Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Seals, 948 S.W.2d 532, 534 n. 1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1997, no writ).
179. Lancer Corp. v. Murillo, 909 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no
writ) (citing Internal Imp. Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1881); see also Knebel
v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799-801 (Tex. 1974)).
180. Id. (citing Greenough, 105 U.S. at 533-34; Knebel, 518 S.W.2d at 799).
181. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954; cf. Valle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5 S.W.3d 745,
746-47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
182. Id. at 955.
183. See Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Mo., Ky. & Tenn. Ry. Co. of Tex., 175 S.W. 816, 817
(Tex. Civ. App. -Dallas 1915, no writ); Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 803-04 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1997, no writ).
184. See, e.g., Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954 (shareholder derivative suits); Bayliss v.
Cernock, 773 S.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)
(same); Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 175 S.W. at 821 (insurance subrogation); Crouch, 853




competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is rea-
sonable ... [and] the reasonableness of any fee depends on the circum-
stances of the services."'1 85 Indeed, an award of attorneys' fees can be
larger than a litigants' recovery on its substantive claim and still be "rea-
sonable" in certain circumstances. 186
Texas courts determine whether a fee is "reasonable" based upon the
factors specified in Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct
1.04.187 Those factors include:
1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service
properly;
2. the likelihood ... that the acceptance of the particular employ-
ment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
4. the amount involved and the results obtained;
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or un-
certainty of collection before the legal services have been
rendered. 188
Evidence of each of the factors is not required to support an attorneys'
fees award.189 However, evidence of some of these factors must be pre-
185. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, LLP, 22 S.W.3d 857, 867 (Tex. 2000) (Gonza-
les, J., joined by Phillips, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The issue
whether it is reasonable to collect a fee is a separate determination. See Law Offices of
Windle Turley, 2003 WL 253643, at *4-5 (attempted collection of contingent fee was held to
be unconscionable).
186. See Flint & Assocs., 739 S.W.2d at 626 (attorney's fees awarded nearly seven times
actual damages); Hawkins v. Owens, No. 01-99-00918-CV, 2000 WL 1199254, at *9 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2000, pet. denied) (awarding attorney's fees that were
two and one-half times larger than the amount paid and judgment awarded, and over five
and one-half times the amount of the $5,000 judgment for contract damages when "case
was transformed from what should have been a simple suit on a loan agreement to a
lengthy, drawn-out battle extending from 1995 to 1999").
187. The reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award is generally a jury question. See
City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 367-69. However, expert testimony is necessary to establish
the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Coca-Cola Co., 111 S.W.3d at 312.
188. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof'l Conduct 1.04; see also Arthur Andersen & Co., 945
S.W.2d at 818. The opposing party's attorneys' fees are not necessarily relevant to the
analysis. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Crowley, 899 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1995, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) ("MCI's attorneys' fees in its defense of this
case are 'patently irrelevant and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence."'); see also M.D. Mark, Inc. v. PIHI P'ship, No. 01-98-00724-CV, 2001
WL 619604, at *12-13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2001, no pet.); but see
DiMiceli v. Affordable Pool Maint., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 164, 174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2003, no pet.) (noting opposing counsel's testimony regarding appellate fees in determining
reasonableness of fees).
189. Burnside Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 113 S.W.3d at 897; Columbia Rio
Grand Reg. Hosp. v. Stover, 17 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.);
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sent to support an award. 190
A. THE ANDERSEN STANDARD
The most oft cited Texas case regarding the reasonableness of contin-
gent fee awards is Arthur Andersen & Company v. Perry Equipment
Corp.19 1 According to Andersen, a trial court cannot award attorneys'
fees purely on evidence of a percentage fee agreement. 192 Instead, the
Court held that a trial court must take into consideration all of the Rule
1.04 factors when making an award of attorneys' fees. 193
In VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Systems, Inc., the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, interpreting Andersen, held that an attorney can still
request that the jury calculate attorneys' fees as a percentage of damages
awarded. 194 Because the jury in that case "was free to reject his re-
quested percentages under the issue submitted, which required them to
award only a specific dollar amount" the award was held not to violate
the principles articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Andersen.1 95
The percentage in VingCard was based upon the Rule 1.04 factors and
covered all expenses and co-counsel's attorneys' fees. 196
Herring v. Bocquet, 21 S.W.3d 367, 368 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). The
Amarillo Court of Appeals has held that the court can also consider "the entire record, the
evidence presented on reasonableness, the amount in controversy, the common knowledge
of the participants as lawyers and judges, and the relative success of the parties."
Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 353 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
190. See Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship v. Long Trusts, No. 12-01-00192-CV, 2003 WL
21771718, at *8-9 (Tex. App.-Tyler, July 31, 2003, pet. filed) (holding fee award unreason-
able based on lack of testimony regarding Rule 1.04 factors) City of Weatherford v. Ca-
tron, 83 S.W.3d 261, 272-73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (affirming award of fees
where evidence was presented on five factors jury questions included an instruction outlin-
ing the factors, and the party requested a specific amount of fees); Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at
341; Sieber & Calicutt, Inc. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 66 S.W.3d 340, 351 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 2001, pet. denied) (upholding trial court's denial of a fee award where there was no
evidence to support any of the 1.04 factors); M.D. Mark, Inc., 2001 WL 619604, at *12-13;
Acquila S.W. Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Exploration, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 240-41 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied.).
191. Arthur Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818. Andersen dealt specifically with the
award of attorneys' fees in a DTPA action. However, courts have applied Andersen's hold-
ing to all proceedings where attorneys' fees are "shifted from one party to the other."
Jackson Law Office, 37 S.W.3d at 24.
192. Anderson, 945 S.W.2d at 818; see also San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor, 115
S.W.3d 82, 106-107 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (finding evidence insuffi-
cient to uphold fee award because "a party seeking fees must ask the jury to award fees in
a specific dollar amount."); Infonova Solutions, Inc. v. Griggs, No. 04-22-00255-CV, 2003
WL 21467091, *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 25, 2003, no pet.) (affirming denial of fees
when only evidence of fees in record was contingency fee contract). Seacoast, Inc. v.
LaCouture, No. 03-96-00506-CV, 1998 WL 29966, at *8 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 29, 1998,
pet. denied) (no publication) (reversing fee award where evidence supporting attorneys'
fee award consisted of attorney and client testifying to terms of contingent fee agreement).
193. Anderson, 945 S.W.2d at 818.
194. Vingcard, 59 S.W.3d at 870; see also Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 262-63 (following Ving-
Card but remanding for determination of fees based on reduction of award on prevailing
claims); Frost Crushed Stone, 110 S.W.3d at 47-48.




Recently, the Austin Court of Appeals, in Allison v. Fire Insurance Ex-
change, followed VingCard to uphold a jury's determination of fees as
reasonable based on expert testimony regarding the contingency fee con-
tract and the Rule 1.04 factors.1 97 VingCard and Allison are thus impor-
tant for an attorney with a contingency fee contract requesting damages
under the Rule 1.04 factors. Note, however, that the litigant must request
a particular amount of fees from the jury or court, 198 and, as discussed,
Section 26.003 appears to impliedly overrule the ability of Texas courts to
utilize the "percentage method" in awarding fees to class counsel. 19 9
B. APPLYING THE RULE 1.04 FACTORS
As stated, Andersen demands that the Rule 104 be considered in calcu-
lating a reasonable fee.20 0 A recent opinion of the Texarkana Court of
Appeals discusses the need for clarity in documentation submitted by
counsel to the trial court in support of this Rule 104 consideration.20 1 In
Rolling Lands Investment, L.C. v. Northwest Airport Management, L.P.,
the Texarkana Court of Appeals remanded for a Rule 104 determination
of reasonableness and necessity of the litigant's fees despite the submis-
sion of a thorough and uncontroverted affidavit in support of the party's
fee request.20 2 The affidavit contained expert testimony that the fees
were, in the affiant's opinion and based on the affiant's twenty years of
experience in commercial litigation, reasonable and necessary,20 3 and also
stated that the affiant took into consideration the usual and customary
fees in the location of the services, the amount in controversy, the legal
questions involved, the fee arrangement with the client, the benefit con-
ferred, and the time required.20 4 Yet, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
looked with suspect on the affiant's statement that the fees were justified
for services that "have been or will be rendered," 20 5 explaining that "[t]he
affidavit by its own terms states that attorney's fees are based partly on
services that have not even been performed but only expect to be per-
formed." 20 6 While not clear from the opinion, it is likely that the affiant
was discussing fees to be awarded in the event of the appeal as those
services that "will be rendered," but the lack of clarity resulted in confu-
sion to the appellate court and ultimate reversal of the fee award-an
immeasurable price for a phrase that could have been clarified with
197. Allison, 98 S.W.3d at 262-63.
198. Id. at 263 ("[T]he jury awarded fees in a specific dollar amount, as requested in the
charge.").
199. See discussion, supra note 159-177.
200. Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818.
201. Rolling Lands Invs., L.C. v. N.W. Airport Mgmt., L.P., 111 S.W.3d 187, 202-03










III. LOOSE ENDS RELATED TO THE RECOVERY OF
ATIORNEYS' FEES IN TEXAS-PRE-PETITION FEES,
SEGREGATION OF FEES, AND RECOVERY OF LEGAL
ASSISTANT AND APPELLATE FEES
Several considerations overlay the recovery of attorneys' fees in Texas
under any statute. Four of these important overlays are discussed herein.
A. PRE-PETITION AND/OR RELATED ACTION FEES
A common question that arises in the fee recovery stage of a case is
whether attorneys' fees incurred before the filing of a suit can be recov-
ered.208 In Williamson v. Tucker, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
pre-petition fees incurred from the point of placing a note in the hands of
an attorney for collection and participation in a related federal suit were
recoverable. 209 The Texas Supreme Court subsequently cited this holding
207. Related to the point made in this case, it is important to remember to properly
designate an expert on attorneys' fees in discovery pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1990). Failure to
comply with this requirement results in exclusion of testimony unless the proffering party
demonstrates good cause for its admission. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d
363, 364 (Tex. 1987). For example, in GATX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum
Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) the plain-
tiff's counsel called himself as an expert witness regarding attorneys' fees, but he had not
identified their attorney as a testifying expert in discovery. The San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that testimony of the plaintiff's counsel should have been excluded by the
trial court due to plaintiff's failure to identify counsel as a fee expert. Id.; see also Nelson v.
Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied.); but see
Wilson v. Chazanow, 105 S.W.3d 21, 28 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (af-
firming trial court's admission of attorney testimony when attorney was mistakenly desig-
nated as fact witness instead of expert witness in pretrial disclosures). However, at least
one Texas court has held that an attorney who has not been identified as an expert witness
with regard to attorney fees can still testify as a fact witness regarding the facts of his
representation. Budd v. Gay, 846 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
no writ); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 et seq. (Vernon 2001); see also In re
Striegler, 915 S.W.2d 629, 643-44 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
208. Because questions like this often arise, it is important to keep adequate documen-
tation of all services rendered by an attorney in furtherance of a client's case. To recover
attorneys' fees, a litigant must produce adequate documentation of the hours expended.
See League of United Latin Am. Citizens No. 4552 (LULAC) v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist.,
119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5th Cir. 1997). "Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the
district court may reduce the award accordingly." See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983); LULAC, 119 F.3d at 1233 ("[i]f the applicant's documentation of the hours
claimed is 'vague or incomplete,' the district court may reduce or eliminate those hours.").
"Litigants take their chances when submitting ... fee applications ... provid[ing] little
information from which to determine the 'reasonableness' of the hours expended on tasks
vaguely referred to." See La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 327 (5th Cir.
1995); see also Sieber & Calicutt, 66 S.W.3d at 340. However, there is no special documen-
tation that is required. Hanif v. Alexander Oil Co., No. 01-01-00954-CV, 2002 WL
31087247, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 19, 2002, no pet.) ("None of the
eight [1.04] factors mandates that time records be kept or precludes an estimate.").
209. Williamson, 615 S.W.2d at 893; see also Swiss Ave. Bank v. Slivka, 724 S.W.2d 394,
398 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding that a party is entitled to recover attorneys
fees incurred by it in defending a prior injunction proceeding).
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with approval.2 10 In Republic Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Shook, the Texas Su-
preme Court held that a bank forced to defend against a borrower's
claims before recovering the outstanding balance of a note it held could
recover all of its attorneys' fees. This was true despite the fact that coun-
sel had actually spent only a few hours on the cause of action for collec-
tion on the note as opposed to the borrower's claim.
2 11
Similarly, several courts have allowed legal fees in related matters to be
recovered absent a clear entitlement.2 12
B. SEGREGATION
Another common and practical problem regarding the recovery of at-
torneys' fees is how to recover fees for work performed in furtherance of
a claim for which attorneys' fees are statutorily authorized when other
claims for which attorneys' fees are not statutorily authorized are also
asserted in the same case. The general rule in Texas is that "in a case
involving more than one claim, attorneys' fees can be awarded only for
necessary legal services rendered in connection with the claims from
which recovery is authorized. 2 13 In fact, "[a] failure to segregate attor-
neys' fees in a case containing multiple causes of action, only some of
which entitle the recovery of attorneys' fees, can result in the recovery of
zero attorneys' fees." 214
However, where the claims are "dependent upon the same set of facts
or circumstances and are thus intertwined to the point of being insepara-
ble, the party suing for attorneys' fees may recover the entire amount
210. Republic Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Shook, 653 S.W.2d 278, 282-83 (Tex. 1983).
211. Id.
212. Gill Say. Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 32 (disapproving of the holding of the court of ap-
peals that, as a matter of law, attorneys fees incurred in a related bankruptcy proceeding
cannot be awarded in a breach of contract claim); Boulware v. Sec. State Bank of Nava-
sota, Tex., 640 S.W.2d 735, 737 (Tex App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ) (holding
that party could recover attorneys' fees incurred prosecuting related claim in Court of
Claims to recover balance of a note); see also McAdams v. McAdams, No. 07-01-0343-CV,
2002 WL 342639, at *13 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 1, 2002, no pet.) (no publication)
(awarding fees incurred in first trial prior to appeal).
213. Flint & Assocs., 739 S.W.2d at 624; see also Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship
I-E v. Newton Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. filed); Am. Hallmark
Ins. Co. v. Lyde, No. 05-97-01611-CV, 2000 WL 1702597, at *9 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 15,
2000, pet. denied) ("segregation of attorneys' fees is required between claims which allow
recovery of fees and claims which do not."). This rule also applies to claims against differ-
ent parties. See Willis v. Donnelly, 118 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
no pet.) ("[W]hen a lawsuit involves multiple claims or multiple parties, the proponent has
a duty to segregate non-recoverable fees from recoverable fees, and to segregate the fees
owed by different parties."); Flagship Hotel, 117 S.W.3d at 565 ("The general rule is that
attorney's fees attributable to other defendants ... must be segregated."). However, this
rule does not require a party to segregate time spent on different theories of the same
cause of action. Id.
214. Green Int'l, 951 S.W.2d at 389. However, at least one court of appeals in Texas has
held that, in a breach of contract case, a party prevailing on a breach of contract claim who
fails to segregate fees for non-recoverable claims should not be completely denied fees.
See Willis, 118 S.W.3d at 48 n.29. Of course if objection to such a failure to segregate is not
made, the objection to recovery of all fees is waived. Id.; Mekdessi v. RISC, Inc., No. 2-02-
169-CV, 2003 WL 1564304, at *4 (Tex. App.-Forth Worth Mar. 27, 2003, pet. denied).
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covering all claims. '215 For this exception to apply, the claims must be so
similar that the same facts must need to be proved for both claims to
succeed. 216 In modern business litigation, this exception appears to be
more common than the rule.217
Of course, to be entitled to all of a group of intertwined fees, the party
seeking fees must have prevailed on the claim that provides for the recov-
ery of fees.218 Further, the court-not the fact finder-makes the deter-
mination of whether fees must be segregated. 219 To be sustained on
appeal, the trial court must specifically perform this segregation analysis
when evaluating the attorneys' fee award.220
Similarly, the general rule in Texas is that segregation of fees is re-
quired if a litigant prosecutes a counterclaim that permits recovery of at-
torneys' fees and also defends a claim in the same action; however,
segregation is not required if the fees cannot be allocated between prose-
cuting the counterclaim and defending the claims.221 Or, stated another
way, if the plaintiff must defeat the counterclaim to succeed on the princi-
pal claim because they arise out of the same facts and are mutually exclu-
sive, then the time spent to defend against the counterclaim need not be
segregated from the time spent pursuing the claim.222
215. Id.; S. Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin. Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446, 449-51 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ); World Help, 977 S.W.2d at 684; Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop.,
829 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), aff'd as modified, Schindler v.
Austwell Farmer Coop., 841 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992)) (granting total amount of fees billed
when "causes of action are so intertwined that they are more or less inseparable"); City of
Alamo, 2001 WL 1003309, at *13.
216. See, e.g., Z.A.O., Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Ctr. Joint Venture, 50 S.W.3d 531, 551
(Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.); Lesikar, 33 S.W.3d at 317. The Texarkana Court of
Appeals recently noted that the test can be met "with evidence of unsegregated attorneys'
fees and a rough percent of the amount attributable to the breach of contract claim." Flag-
ship Hotel, 117 S.W.3d at 566 n.7.
217. There are, however, several cases in which courts have found that this test was not
satisfied and refused to award the party all attorneys' fees. See Flagship Hotel, 117 S.W.3d
at 565-66 (holding that declaratory judgment claim involved different legal and factual ar-
guments than breach of contract claim).
218. Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied).
219. Merch. Ctr., Inc. v. WNS, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 389, at 398 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied).
220. Rainbow Group, Ltd., 2002 WL 1991141, at *11. Of course, an objection to the
opposing party's failure to segregate fees is waived if objection is not made at the time the
evidence of fees is presented or at the time of the charge. Beard Family P'ship v. Commer-
cial Indem. Ins. Co., 116 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Holmes v.
Concord Holmes, Ltd., 115 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
221. Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112, 130 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); Coleman v. Rotana, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 867, 873-74
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Wilkins v. Bain, 615 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (granting all fees when "claim to recover the contract price
necessarily involved the same facts as [the] counterclaim both arise out of the same trans-
action; thus, whether the contract was oral or written").
222. Pegasus Energy Group., Inc., 3 S.W.3d at 130; but see Willis, 118 S.W.3d at 48
(reversing and remanding fee award for failure to segregate fees in defending counter-
claims and jury charge asked for award of all fees in case).
20041
SMU LAW REVIEW
C. LEGAL ASSISTANT FEES
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not expressly spoken on the
issue whether legal assistant fees are recoverable as part of attorneys' fees
in any given statute authorizing the recovery of attorneys' fees, the Dallas
Court of Appeals, in Gill Savings Association v. International Supply
Co., 223 set forth the basic test: "[C]ompensation for a legal assistant's
work may be separately assessed and included in the award of attorney's
fees if a legal assistant performs work that has traditionally been done by
any attorney. '22 4 To recover for the work of a legal assistant, five consid-
erations are important: "(1) that the legal assistant is qualified through
education, training or work experience to perform substantive legal work;
(2) that substantive legal work was performed under the direction and
supervision of an attorney; (3) the nature of the legal work which was
performed; (4) the hourly rate being charged for the legal assistant; and
(5) the number of hours expended by the legal assistant. '225
The Gill Savings court ultimately determined that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees
because the time sheets submitted to the court did not establish the quali-
fications, if any, of the legal assistants who performed the work, whether
the tasks performed by the legal assistants were of a substantive legal
nature or were the performance of clerical duties, or the hourly rate
charged for the legal assistants. 226 The court also held that without testi-
mony identifying the initials in the timesheets, it was impossible to deter-
mine which class of professionals-qualified legal assistants or legal
clerks-had performed the relevant tasks. 227
In Moody v. EMC Services, Inc.,228 the Houston (Fourteenth District)
Court of Appeals followed the test established in Gill Savings.229 Even
though the claimant failed to specifically identify the legal assistants or




227. Id.; see also Law Offices of Rodney R. Elkins v. Alexander, No. 05-95-00446-CV,
1996 WL 167923, at *6 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 8, 1996, no writ) (holding the "[b]ecause
[the plaintiff] offered no evidence about the qualifications or supervision of legal assistants,
the trial court did not err in concluding there was insufficient evidence to justify awarding
fees for services of legal assistants"); but see Chevron Chem. Co. v. Southland Contracting,
Inc, No. 05-96-00560-CV, 1998 WL 640987, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 21,1998, pet.
denied) (upholding the award of attorneys' fees without any consideration of work per-
formed by legal assistants and concluding "that because [the prevailing party] did not re-
quest any award of attorney's fees for work performed by legal assistants, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit [the non-prevailing party's] proposed jury
instruction delineating the Gill Savings factor for recovery of legal assistant fees"); but see
Nat'l Dev. & Research Corp. v. Panda Global Energy Co., No. 05-00-00820-CV, 2002 WL
1060483, at *8 n.4 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 29, 2002, pet. denied) (upholding $26,000 in
attorneys' fees based on the work of "para professionals" because the fee statements show
the name of each person performing the work, the nature of the work, and the time and
rate of each person).





their qualifications; however, the court affirmed the award for attorney's
fees, including work performed by legal assistants. 230
D. APPELLATE FEES
An additional question that often arises with respect to the recovery of
attorneys' fees involves the recovery of fees for appellate work. Texas
juries are routinely asked to award fees for appellate work that will only
be paid in the event such work is undertaken successfully.231 A fee re-
quest for appellate work should be segregated into fees for work to be
performed on direct appeal to the court of appeals and on petition for
hearing by the Texas Supreme Court and should be supported by suffi-
cient evidence. 232 Appellate fee awards are often reformed by the
courts.
233
IV. RECOVERY OF COSTS AND EXPENSES
Similar to attorneys' fees, costs and expenses are not recoverable unless
there is a statute which expressly provides for recovery of the same. 234
A. RECOVERING COSTS
As a general rule "each party to a suit shall be liable to the officers of
the court for all costs incurred by himself. '235 However, many costs are
recoverable by statute. For example, Section 31.007 of the Code allows a
judge to "include in any order or judgment all costs," including:
1. Clerk's fees and any service fees due to the county;
2. Court reporter's fees for original stenographic transcripts obtained
to use in the suit;
230. Id.
231. A trial court may not award a litigant an unconditional award of attorney's fees for
an appeal. Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 24 S.W.3d 386, 400-01 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2000, pet. denied). "To do so, could penalize a party for pursuing a mentioned appeal." Id.;
see also Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied);
Humble Nat'l Bk. v. DCV, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, writ denied).
232. Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 706-07 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ) (holding that a jury award of attorneys' fees including
potential appellate work was supported by sufficient evidence in the record); Holland v.
Nelson, No. 05-02-00283-CV, 2003 WL 22180444, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 23, 2003,
pet. denied) (remanding case based on lack of evidence to support award of attorneys' fees
on appeal); see also Centroplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1987, no writ).
233. See Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989,
writ denied).
234. "Ordinary expenses occurred by a party in prosecuting or defending suit cannot be
recovered either as damages or by way of court costs in the absence of statutory provisions
or usages of equity." Flint & Assocs., 739 S.W.2d at 626; see also Brandtjen & Kluge, 238
S.W.2d at 609. To the extent possible, the award should also be segregated into the amount
attributable to the portion of the case that successful on appeal. Holland, 2003 WL
22180444, at *2.
235. TEx. R. Civ. P. 140.
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3. The fee for masters, interpreters, and guardians ad litem appointed
by the court; and
4. Such other costs and fees as may be permitted by these rules and
state statutes.
236
More importantly, Rule 131 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure enti-
tles a successful party to recover "all costs incurred therein" from its ad-
versary.2 37 "Rule 131's underlying purpose is to ensure that the
prevailing party is freed of the burden of court costs and that the losing
party pays those costs," 2 3 8 and the court can stray from this mandatory
requirement only "for good cause. '239
"'Good cause' is an elusive concept that varies from case to case."'2 40
Generally "good cause" will be found when a party unnecessarily pro-
longs proceedings, unreasonably increases costs, or generally does some
act worthy of sanction. 241 If the court determines costs should not be
awarded, then "good cause" for such an award must be specifically stated
on the record.242 Furthermore, even when the trial court states good
cause on the record "an appellate court should scrutinize the record to
determine whether it supports the trial judge's decision. '243
This Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the degree of
specificity required to depart, for "good cause," from the general rule
that the prevailing party recover costs pursuant to Rule 131 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. 244 In Roberts v. Williamson, the Texas Supreme
Court upheld the reversal of the trial court's apportionment of guardian
ad litem costs between the plaintiff-parents and the defendant-doctor in a
medical malpractice case. 245 Although the trial court had explained its
reasons for splitting the ad litem costs, it had not done so with the speci-
236. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 31.007 (Vernon 2001).
237. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131. However, it should be noted that the statute provides for
recovery of costs "except where otherwise provided." Id.
238. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2001).
239. Tex. R. Civ. P. 141. Note, however, that the Declaratory Judgment Act provides
for the award of costs to either party as are equitable and just. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REME-
DIES CODE § 37.009; see, e.g., W. Beach Marina, Ltd., 94 S.W.3d at 270.
240. Furr's, 53 S.W.3d at 377.
241. Id. Potential emotional harm from assessing costs to the losing party is not "good
cause" as a matter of law.
242. Furr's, 53 S.W.3d at 376.
243. Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (citing
Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1985).
244. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124-25. Specifically, the trial court had stated that,
I think that an attorney ad litem is there for the benefit of all the parties that
are there. I would like to, for this to be assessed as court costs, and I would
like for it to be split between the Plaintiffs and between the Defendant in
that particular regard. And I think that way, it would be a little bit more fair
to all parties that are concerned. And I don't think simply because there was
a verdict returned against an individual, that he pays it all. We're looking at
a situation where the Court feels that it would be in the best interest of the
child for this individual to be appointed. And, therefore, as a result of that, it
should be assessed as a court cost, and be born one half by [the Defendant],





ficity required by Rule 141 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 246
Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court stated that "[clertainly, fairness
can be good cause, but the record must substantiate the connection.
2 4 7
In so stating, it distinguished its prior opinion in Rogers v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., where the trial court "had demonstrated good cause when
assessing part of the ad litem costs against the prevailing party because
the conduct of that party had unnecessarily prolonged and obstructed the
trial. '2 48 In contrast to Rogers, the court found the record in this case to
be insufficient: "Here, the trial court's finding of good cause is premised
on the perception that the prevailing party incidentally benefited from
the guardian ad litem's services. Assuming that such an incidental benefit
might in a particular case provide good cause, Rule 141 still requires that
the trial court state its reasons 'on the record' and with more specificity
than the court's general notion of fairness here.
249
B. NON-RECOVERABLE COSTS
Some costs are specifically disallowed, either by statute or case law.
For example, Rule 902(10)(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence requires a
party to bear its own copying costs if it chooses to copy records attached
to affidavits filed by another party.25 0 Similarly, Texas Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 140 prohibits including fees for copies in an award of costs.
251
Case law also disallows certain items, such as expert witness fees2 52 and
costs for certified copies of deeds used at trial.2 53 For example, the Dallas
Court of Appeals has held that ordinary expenses like photocopy, travel,
long distance, postage, filing fees, fax charges, and messenger/courier ex-
penses are typically not recoverable as expenses because they are consid-
246. Id.
247. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124.
248. Id. (citing Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601).
249. Id. (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 141); see also Ray v. McFarland, 97 S.W.3d 728, 730-31
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (reversing the trial court's judgment setting aside
the jury verdict on good faith and just cause and holding that "[a]ccordingly, [the plaintiff]
was the successful party at trial" and since "the judgment did not state that the trial court
was holding [the plaintiff] responsible for her own costs for 'good cause,"' the trial court
abused its discretion in taxing court costs against the party incurring them) (quoting TEX.
R. Civ. P. 141)); Moore v. Trevino, 94 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet.
denied) ("Because appellees were the prevailing parties below and 'good cause' for not
awarding costs to them is not stated on the record, the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to award appellees costs pursuant to Rule 131."); Finlay v. Olive, 77 S.W.3d 520, 528
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (finding the trial court abused its discretion
in not awarding costs to the successful party and stating that "we do not presume that the
trial court made the necessary finding in this situation"); Dean's Campin' Co. v. Hardsteen,
No. 01-00-01190-CV, 2002 WL 1980840, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29,
2002, pet. denied) ("Ability to pay ... does not constitute good cause, as contemplated by
rule 141, to depart from the general rule stated in Rule 131.").
250. See Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8; TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 904(10)(a).
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 140 provides that "no fee for a copy of a paper not required by law
or these rules to be copied shall be taxed in the bill of costs." Id.
252. See City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
253. Phillips v. Wertz, 579 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
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ered part of "the overhead of a law practice" and can be recovered as a
component of reasonable attorneys' fees at least pursuant to Aection
38.001.254
V. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to update business litigants on recent develop-
ments in the field of recovering attorneys' fees and to provide these busi-
ness litigants with tools helpful in recovering or defending against the
recovery of attorneys' fees in Texas. As with any field of law, this recov-
ery is an art, not a science, is ever-changing, and oft times requires trial
and error to succeed.
254. Flint, 739 S.W.2d at 626; Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997
S.W.2d 803, 817 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
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